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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Civil Rights-Sex Discrimination-Employer's Failure to Provide
Pregnancy Disability Benefits Does Not Violate Title VII.-As part of
its "cradle-to-grave" 1 fringe benefit package, General Electric Company (GE)
provides a comprehensive disability insurance plan. Employees receive ben-
efits based on a percentage of their weekly income for the period they are
totally disabled by a non-occupational sickness or accident. Benefits are
payable regardless of the cause of the incapacity, 2 with one exception-
disabilities arising from pregnancy.3 Thus while the plan excludes a disability
limited to women, it covers all those which affect only males (e.g., vasec-
tomies and circumcisions).4 A class action challenging the legality of this
exclusion was instituted by women employees who had been denied preg-
nancy disability benefits.5 The suit charged that to exclude pregnancy-related
disabilities 6 from otherwise comprehensive coverage constituted a violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7
The district court found that GE had engaged in sex discrimination
violative of Title V[II8 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 9
1. Brief for Appellee at 54, Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd,
97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
2. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 404 (1976). GE's plan covers more than the
typical sickness and accident. The company has paid for absences caused by skiing accidents,
purely elective cosmetic surgery, attempted suicide, circumcision, alcoholism and drug addiction
cures, venereal disease, and hair transplants. Id. at 416 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brief for
Appellee at 25, Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401
(1976).
3. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 404 (1976). Commentators have stressed that
disability benefits plans are not expected to cover the mere condition of pregnancy. Pregnancy
benefits would be limited to the actual period of disability and would not extend into the
post-disability child rearing period. Binder, Pregnancy, Maternity Leave and Title VII, I Ohio
No. U.L. Rev. 31 (1973); Koontz, Childbirth and Child Rearing Leave: Job Related Benefits, 17
N.Y.L.F. 480 (1971). For judicial findings regarding the duration of most pregnancy-related
disabilities see note 8 infra.
4. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 382-83 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d
661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
5. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 404 (1976). Seven named female employees
were joined by their labor union, the International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its affiliate, Local 161. Id. at 405 n.5.
6. In addition to excluding pregnancy benefits, the plan calls for immediate cancellation of all
coverage when an employee takes a maternity leave, but provides for 31 days continued coverage
in cases of personal leave, strike or layoff. Id. at 404-05 n.4. Under this provision one plaintiff
was denied benefits for the period of time she was disabled by a pulmonary embolism suffered
subsequent to, but unrelated to an abnormal pregnancy. Had the employee been on strike, she
would have recovered. Id; at 416 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 404. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975) (originally
enacted as Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253).
8. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a disability benefits plan does not
violate Title VII by its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities. General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 is intended to equalize em-
ployment opportunity'" by eliminating discriminatory practices based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.' 2 The Act bans sex discrimination in the
terms, conditions and privileges of employment' 3 with certain statutorily
defined exceptions.1 4 The sex discrimination provision, apparently added as a
Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct 401 (1976). The district court made findings, inter alia, on the
relationship of pregnancy to disease and disability. The court found that ten percent of
pregnancies are terminated by miscarriage which is usually disabling for only a few days. Normal
pregnancy is disabling for six to eight weeks. Ten percent of pregnancies involve complications
other than miscarriage. These complications may be disabling and, in approximately one half the
cases, hospitalization is required. Id. at 376-77.
The court found that while pregnancy itself is not a disease, complications "incident to
pregnancy come within the meaning of 'disease.' " Id. at 376. Five percent of pregnancies (half
the abnormal pregnancies) are complicated by diseases such as hypertension and diabetes which
are stimulated by rapid weight gain associated with pregnancy. Five percent of pregnancies are
complicated by "pregnancy-related" diseases such as detachment or mislocation of the placenta.
Id.
9. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). In
affirming, the court of appeals distinguished the Supreme Court's intervening decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), as inapposite in a Title VII context. 419 F.2d at 666. In
Geduldig, a state administered disability insurance program which excluded disabilities arising
from normal pregnancy was held not to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See notes 59-69 infra and accompanying text.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
11. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). Section 2000e-2(a)(1)
provides in relevant part- "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . ." See generally
Developments-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
13. See note 12 supra. The EEOC fringe benefit guidelines state that fringe benefits are
included within the phrase "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment" in which Title VII
prohibits discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1975).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(e)-(h), (") (1970). The principal exception applicable to cases
involving sex discrimination (but not racial discrimination) is the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ) exception: An employer may hire employees "on the basis of... sex . .. in those
certain instances where.., sex... is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e--2(e)(l)
(1970). The BFOQ exception is to be narrowly construed. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (being female not a BFOQ for job of flight cabin
attendant); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1969)
(switchman position does not require male employees); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1975). Employers
have the burden of establishing a BFOQ exception. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d at 232.
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consequence of a last-minute attempt to defeat passage of the Act as a
whole,' 5 is accompanied by little legislative history to aid the courts in
determining the extent of its intended reach. 16 Indeed, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 17 the agency charged with the
interpretation1 8 and enforcement 9 of Title VII, had difficulty in defining the
employment practices which Congress intended to prohibit as sex discrimina-
tion. 20 Particularly vexing was the issue of whether the sex discrimination
provision is applicable outside the context of direct male/female competition 2
to prevent disadvantageous treatment of the members of one sex on the basis
of a sex-unique characteristic such as pregnancy. 22 Although initially of the
Another exception assures consistency between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Title VII
permits an employer to "differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid . . . employees . . . if such differentiation is authorized by . . .
section 206(d) of Title 29." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(h) (1970). Section 6(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act
provides that an employer may differentiate on the basis of sex in wages paid "pursuant to (1) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex . . . ." 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(1) (1970).
In addition to statutory exceptions, a judicially created and defined defense of business
necessity has been applied in cases where a neutral policy has had a discriminatory effect. Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d
652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). The test for whether an employment practice is justified
by business necessity "is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for adhering to a
challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose
such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business." Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d at 798.
15. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on
jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). The added criterion of sex as a basis for discrimina-
tion was offered as a floor amendment in the House by opponents of the bill. Developments,
supra note 12, at 1167; Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 Duke L.J. 671, 676-77 & n.36 [hereinafter cited as
Sex Discrimination].
16. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. at 412.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975) (authorizing formation of
EEOC).
18. Id. § 2000e-12(a) (1970) gives EEOC authority to "issue, amend, or rescind suitable
procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." Id. Since the EEOC is
limited to issuing procedural regulations its interpretive guidelines do not have the force of
substantive law. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. at 410-11.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. V, 1975).
20. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. at 418 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. This concept of sex discrimination is expressed in the Supreme Court's definition of sex
discrimination in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971): "[Ihe Civil Rights Act
of 1964 requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective
of their sex." Id. at 544.
22. The EEOC's first annual report covering the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966 stated: "The
prohibition against sex discrimination is especially difficult to apply with respect to the female
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opinion that practices directed at pregnancy were outside the scope of Title
VII protection, 23 the EEOC had, by 1972, definitively determined that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is discrimination on the basis of
sex. 24 In that year, the Commission promulgated pregnancy guidelines stat-
ing, in part, that "[d]isabilities caused . . . by pregnancy .. . are, for all
job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such
under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan
available in connection with employment. '2 S
In lower federal courts, employers defended against charges of sex dis-
crimination by attacking the validity of the pregnancy guidelines26 and their
accuracy as an expression of congressional intent. 27 They sought to justify
employee who becomes pregnant." Comment, Waiting for the Other Shoe-Wetzel and Gilbert in
the Supreme Court, 25 Emory L.J. 125, 130 n.34 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wetzel and Gilbert].
23. The EEOC's initial position was that "pregnancy necessarily must be treated uniquely."
Id. In 1966 the EEOC General Counsel issued opinion letters expressing the same view. General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. at 411.
24. The first indication that the EEOC had changed its view was a 1971 decision finding a
disability plan which excluded pregnancy violative of Title VII. Decision No. 71-1474, 1973 CCH
EEOC Dec. 6221 (Mar. 19, 1971). In 1969, the EEOC had already decided that mandatory
maternity leaves are discriminatory. Decision No. 70-360, 1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 6034 (Dec.
16, 1969). These two decisions were included in the fifth and sixth EEOC annual reports to
Congress for the years ending June 30, 1970 and June 30, 1971 respectively. Brief for Appellee at
66-68, Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
However, Congress, during its consideration and enactment of the 1972 amendments, was not
informed of the impending issuance of the pregnancy guidelines. Wetzel and Gilbert, supra note
22, at 133.
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975). The EEOC pregnancy guidelines provide:
"(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from employment
applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima fade violation of Title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and
recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated
as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in
connection with employment. Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involving
matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the
accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any
health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to
disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to
other temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an
employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates
the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business
necessity." Id. § 1604.10 (1975).
26. Employers contended the guidelines were an abuse of administrative power. Wetzel and
Gilbert, supra note 22, at 129-34 (giving a detailed discussion of the procedural, tactical, and
substantive errors of the EEOC which made the guidelines subject to attack). See also Comment,
Current Trends in Pregnancy Benefits---1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 De Paul L. Rev.
127, 137-38 (1974).
27. Employers pointed to the fact that the guidelines were not issued until eight years after
the enactment of Title VII and that the EEOC's earlier position was a better indicator of
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their failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities, inter alia,28 on the theory
that the nature of pregnancy itself and the cost of its coverage provided
reasonable bases for the exclusion. Employers contended that they did not
cover pregnancy because pregnancy is not a disease but is, in contrast, a
voluntary and normal condition. 29 They further asserted that the cost of
providing pregnancy coverage would be prohibitive. 30 It was suggested that
to include pregnancy coverage would result in an economic advantage to
female employees and would, therefore, constitute reverse discrimination.
3 1
The lower courts almost uniformly rejected employers' attacks on the
guidelines. Finding that congressional intent was not shown to be contrary,
these courts accorded "great deference" to the EEOC's interpretation of the
Act. 32 The guidelines were held to be consistent with the "plain meaning" and
purpose of Title VII. 33
congressional intent. E.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 664-65 n.12 (4th Cir.
1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Wetzel and Gilbert, supra note 22, at 134.
28. For a list of typical employer arguments see Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp.
367, 378-79 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
Some of the arguments seem rather attenuated. GE argued that paying pregnancy benefits would
amount to a subsidy of childbirth contrary to the public policy of population control. Id. at 379.
In support of its theory that income maintenance during pregnancy disability would Increase
childbirths, GE cited the results of its "experiment in public relations." Id. at 379 n. 10. "Exactly
nine months prior to G.E.'s 75th Anniversary on October 15, 1953, the company announced that
it would give five shares of stock to any employee who had a child born on the anniversary date.
Preliminary estimates were that 15-20 awards would be given. The actual total turned out to be
189." Id. It has been noted, however, that the Commission on Population Growth and the
American Future concluded that "[olvert and subtle discrimination against women has meant
undue pressure toward childbearing and child-rearing." Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the
Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 617, 691 n.277 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Johnston].
29. E.g., Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Iowa 1975);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1158 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 199
(3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
30. E.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1162-63 (W.D. Pa. 1974),
aff'd, 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
31. Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 409 F. Supp. 28, 33 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Gilbert v. General Elec.
Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 379 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct.
401 (1976).
32. Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1976); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 854 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1976); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 725 (1977) (mem.); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d
661, 664 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d
651, 653 (8th Cir. 1975); Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024,
1030 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 724 (1977) (mem.); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976);
Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 248, 263 (N.D. Miss. 1976); Liss v. School
Dist., 396 F. Supp. 1035 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (mem.), vacated and remanded, Nos. 75-1440 & 75-1477
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The courts reasoned that a plan which covers all male disabilities but
excludes pregnancy, a major cause of female disability, is sexual discrimina-
tion since it provides women with less comprehensive coverage than men.34 It
exposes only women to the hardship of income loss on the basis of a condition
which is "unique to women and a basic characteristic of their sex." 3S Stated
conversely, the pregnancy exclusion requires the woman employee to surren-
der her right to exercise a peculiarly female function-childbearing-as a
condition to parity of coverage. 36 One court found a comprehensive plan
which excluded pregnancy to be "self evident" sex discrimination; 37 another
suggested that to find differently would be absurd. 38
(8th Cir., filed Feb. 1, 1977); Zichyv. City of Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787-88 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Farkas v.
South Western City School Dist., 8 F.E.P.C. 288, 289 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1400 (6th
Cir. 1974); Vineyard v. Hollister Elem. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580, 583 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Butsee,
Newmonv. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238, 245 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (finding that a mandatory
maternity leave policy violates Title VII but the exclusion of pregnancy from disability coverage
does not).
The Supreme Court had held that the EEOC's interpretive guidelines are to be accorded great
deference by the courts, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 404 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971), unless
"application of the guideline[s] would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent not to
reach the employment practice in question." Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
Applying these principles to the pregnancy benefits cases, courts placed the burden on those
challenging the EEOC position to show that the guidelines were inconsistent with congressional
intent In view of the absence of relevant legislative history, it is not surprising that the employers
failed to do so. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on
jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
33. E.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on
jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). See also Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661
(4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). "We entertain no doubt that it was the legislative
purpose in enacting Title VII to prohibit any disparity. . . that might be sex-related in fringe
benefits. And this would be our opinion, whatever might be the language of the Commission's
guidelines." Id. at 665 n.12.
34. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 664 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. CL 401
(1976); Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Iowa 1975);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 199
(3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
35. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 664 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401
(1976).
36. E.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 381-82 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519
F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). "[D]efendant's policy penalizes plaintiffs and
members of their class for being women and suffering disabilities to which they alone are
inherently susceptible, and this is discriminatory." Id. at 382. One commentator has noted that
"women, to be treated without discrimination [under Title VII], must be permitted to be women."
Sex Discrimination, supra note 15, at 721-22. The court of appeals in Gilbert explained that
"this means a right to be 'women' without being burdened by any discrimination in employment
benefits. . . on account of characteristics peculiar to their sex." Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519
F.2d 661, 664 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
37. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 386 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, S19 F.2d 661
(4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. CL 401 (1976).
38. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511
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The arguments which attempted to distinguish pregnancy from illness were
dismissed as irrelevant in the context of a disability benefits or sick leave
plan. 39 A woman who is disabled by pregnancy has the same need for tnco.ne
maintenance as persons suffering from other disabilities. 40 The "voluntari-
ness" 4 1 of pregnancy did not justify its exclusion since plans covered other
voluntary or quasi-voluntary disabilities. 42
The courts were similarly unpersuaded by the employers' arguments con-
cerning cost.43 Increased cost was held not to be a valid defense for sex
discrimination. 4 4 In answer to the reverse discrimination argument, one court
F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). In questioning
whether a disability plan which excludes pregnancy involves sex discrimination "it might appear
to the lay mind that we are treading on the brink of a precipice of absurdity. Perhaps the
admonition of Professor Thomas Reed Powell to his law students is apt; 'If you can think of
something which is inextricably related to some other thing and not think of the other thing, you
have a legal mind.'" Id.
39. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 385 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661
(4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
40. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on
jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) (pointing out that a woman disabled by pregnancy
may have even greater need for income than other disabled persons since she will probably have
hospital expenses). "Nearly two-thirds of all women who work do so of necessity: either they are
unmarried or their husbands earn less than $7,000 per year." Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
501 n.5 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Wetzel and Gilbert, supra note 22, at 151-53
(economic impact on the pregnant employee).
41. In view of the fact that methods of contraception are imperfect and women may have
valid health and religious reasons for avoiding their use, pregnancy is not necessarily voluntary.
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
42. GE's plan covered purely elective disabilities. See note 2 supra. Liberty Mutual's plan did
not cover purely voluntary disabilities, but the court noted: "There are a great many activities
that people participate in that involve a recognized risk. Most people undertake these activities
with full knowledge of the potential harm. Drinking intoxicating beverages, smoking, skiing,
handball and tennis are all types of activities in which one could sustain harm." Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737
(1976).
43. For a discussion of the economic impact on employers of requiring pregnancy disability
coverage see Wetzel and Gilbert, supra note 22, at 153-59. See also Kistler & McDonough, Paid
Maternity Leave-Benefits May Justify the Cost, 26 Labor L.J. 782 (1975).
44. Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Iowa 1975)
(whatever expense is necessary to treat pregnancy on the same basis as other disabilities under a
sick leave plan must be borne by employers and consumers of goods as a cost of production);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1162-63 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d
199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on juridictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) (adjustments should be
made in the plan to accommodate the increased premium, e.g., reduction in maximum benefits).
Some courts deferred to the EEOC fringe benefits guideline, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e)(1975), which
provides: "It shall not be a defense under title VII to a charge of sex discrimination in [fringe]
benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other." Id. Wetzel
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S.
737 (1976); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 248, 263 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
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reasoned that should women, as a result of pregnancy coverage, derive a
marginally greater economic benefit from the plan than men, it would simply
be a "recognition of women's biologically more burdensome place in the
scheme of human existence." 45
By the time the Supreme Court had occasion to definitively decide the
question of pregnancy benefits in a Title VII action,4 6 the six courts of appeals
which had considered the issue had unanimously held that for an employer to
treat pregnancy differently from other disabilities is sex discrimination viola-
tive of Title VII.
47
The cases involving pregnancy classifications which the Supreme Court
decided on constitutional grounds gave a good indication of the position the
Court would eventually take in deciding analogous cases under Title VII.4 8
The Supreme Court first considered employment policies dealing with
pregnancy in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.49 The challenged
policy was a board of education rule which imposed mandatory, unpaid
maternity leaves on pregnant school teachers and, in addition, set restrictions
on a teacher's eligibility to resume work.50 The case was briefed, argued and
decided in both lower courts on equal protection grounds.5 1 The district court
Courts rejected the defense of business necessity. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367,
382 (E.D. Va. 1974), affd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. CL 401 (1976); Wetzel v.
Liberty MuL Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1162-63 (W.D. Pa. 1974), alld, Sl F.2d 199 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). See note 14 supra.
45. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 383 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661
(4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. CL 401 (1976). See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (e)(1975), quoted at note 44
supra.
46. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 199
(3d Cir. 1975), was the first case raising the issue of pregnancy benefits to be granted certiorari by
the Supreme Court. 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). The Court, however, did not reach the merits but
vacated the decision on jurisdictional grounds. 424 U.S. 737 (1976). For the decision on remand
see 13 F.E.P.C. 1005 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 535 F.zd 1248, cert. denied, 97 S. CL 530
(1976).
47. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. CL 806
(1977); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 97 S. Ct. 725 (1977) (mem.); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.
1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1977); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir.
1975); Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 97 S. CL 724 (1977) (mem.); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., s1 F.2d
199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
48. A detailed analysis of Supreme Court holdings on sex discrimination and pregnancy on
constitutional grounds is beyond the scope of this Recent Development. For an excellent
discussion see Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex
Discrimination, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 441, 443-56 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. See
generally Johnston, supra note 28.
49. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). LaFleur was a consolidation of two cases in which the fourth and
sixth circuits had reached contrary results. Id. at 638. See also, Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
50. 414 U.S. at 634-35. Teachers were not permitted to return to work until the next regular
semester after the child reached three months of age. Id.
51. Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection? 72 Mich.
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upheld the rule on the ground that it did not discriminate against women
because of sex and was reasonably related to the government's interest in
quality education.5 2 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the manda-
tory maternity leave rule was an arbitrary restriction on employment based on
sex.
53
The Supreme Court ignored the lower courts' equal protection analysis and
instead affirmed the court of appeals decision on due process grounds.5 4 The
Court held that the mandatory maternity leave policy created an impermissi-
ble, irrebuttable presumption of incompetency which unduly impinged on the
teacher's right to bear children.5 5 Subsequently, in Turner v. Department of
Employment Security,5 6 the Supreme Court followed its irrebuttable pre-
sumption analysis5 7 and struck down, as violative of due process, a Utah
unemployment insurance law which made pregnant women ineligible for
benefits during the last trimester of pregnancy.58
L. Rev. 800, 809 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Conclusive Presumption]. The case was not brought
under Title VII because, at the time the teachers were placed on mandatory maternity leave,
Title VII had not been amended to reach discrimination by public employers. 414 U.S. at 639
n.8.
52. LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), vacated, rev'd,
and remanded, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
53. 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
54. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). "[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause . . . ." Id. at 639.
55. Id. at 648. Irrebuttable presumptions have been held to violate equal protection. See,
e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 350-51 (1972) (durational residence requirement for voter
registration, creating conclusive presumption that recent arrivals within state were nonresidents,
unduly penalized right to vote and right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631
(1969) (one'year residence requirement for eligibility to apply for welfare assistance, containing
nonrebuttable presumption that every applicant for assistance in the first year of residence came
into jurisdiction solely to obtain benefits, unduly burdened right to travel); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (state constitutional provision that permitted servicemen to vote only in
county of residence at the time of entry into service, creating irrebuttable presumption that
members of armed forces not domiciled in state for franchise purposes, unduly infringed right to
vote). However, by using a due process analysis the Court avoided the necessity of deciding
whether or not pregnancy classifications involve sex discrimination and under what standard of
equal protection review they should be scrutinized. Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 Ind. L. Rev. 644, 649 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bezanson].
Due process analysis affords pregnant women less protection than equal protection analysis since,
under the former, pregnant women need not be treated like others who are temporarily disabled.
They need only be given an opportunity of rebutting the irrebuttable presumption of incapacity.
See Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1532,
1545-46 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Uniqueness Trap].
56. 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam).
57. For a detailed discussion of the use of irrebuttable presumptions see Bezanson, supra note
55; Johnston, supra note 28; Conclusive Presumption, supra note 51; Note, The Irrebuttable
Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1534 (1974).
58. 423 U.S. at 45-46. The Court recognized that the ability to work during and after
pregnancy is an individual matter. Stating that due process requires that more individualized
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In Geduldig v. Aielloj 9 the Supreme Court decided a case involving
pregnancy classifications squarely on equal protection grounds. California's
state administered, employee-funded disability insurance program excluded
disabilities relating to normal pregnancy. 60 The program was challenged as
constituting discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6'
The Court, as in all equal protection cases, had several options open to it.
First, it could have applied a minimal standard of equal protection review
traditionally used to defer to the judgment of state legislatures in enacting
social welfare laws. Under this approach, the program would be upheld if it
bore a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. 62 Second,
the Court could have applied the more stringent standard of review employed
in sex discrimination cases, which requires that a classification substantially
further a legitimate objective. 63 Third, the Court could have declared sex a
means be used to determine incapacity, the Court concluded that the provision created an
irrebuttable presumption of incapacity violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 46.
59. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
60. Id. at 486. The decision was limited to normal pregnancy since, shortly before judgment,
the California legislature had amended the program to include coverage of abnormal pregnancy.
The legislative action was apparently the result of a California state court ruling in Retzer v.
California Unemp. Ins. App. Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (2d Dist. 1973), that
the exclusion of disabilities arising from abnormal pregnancy was unconstitutional. 417 U.S. at
491-92. See Cal. Unempl. Ins. Code §§ 2626, 2626.2 (West 1974), as amended (West 1976).
61. 417 U.S. at 487.
62. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78, 81-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970). This standard of
equal protection review has been aptly termed: "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact." Gunther, Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
63. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), used a test of "fair and substantial relation." In
Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct 451 (1976), Jostice Brennan's majority opinion reviews the gender
based discrimination cases to date and formulates the applicable standard of equal protection
scrutiny as follows: "To withstand constitutional challenge ... classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id. at 457. However, Justice Brennan's test has apparently not been accepted
by a majority of the Court. See Id. at 463-64 (Powell, J., concurring), and Id. at 464-65 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
It should be noted that the more incisive, "intermediate," standard of scrutiny has not been
employed when to do so would invalidate a law whose purpose is to alleviate the effects of past
discrimination against women. Id. at 457 n.6. Instead the law has been reviewed under the
minimal scrutiny standard to determine if it is reasonably related to the remedial purpose. See
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See Note, The
Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 Duke L.J. 163. Before
either standard is applied, Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, (1974), demonstrates that the
Court will look beyond a professed remedial objective, and vill examine the statutory scheme and
the legislative history to determine whether the real purpose of the statute is to compensate
women for previous disadvantages. Id. at 648.
For a detailed discussion of sex discrimination under the equal protection clause see Gunther,
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suspect classification and used strict scrutiny to knock down the legislation
absent a finding that it entailed the least drastic means to accomplish a
compelling state interest."
In Geduldig, the Court not only failed to declare sex a suspect class but
upheld the program using the minimal scrutiny standard of equal protection
review.6 It held that the exclusion of normal pregnancy was rationally
related to California's interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of the
program while providing maximum disability coverage. 6
The reason the Court used minimal scrutiny rather than the more stringent
standard applicable to sex discrimination cases was that, in the Court's view,
the exclusion of pregnancy did not involve sex discrimination at all. 67 The
Court's explanation was hidden in two cryptic sentences in the text and in the
now classic footnote 20. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated: "There
is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there
is no risk from which women are protected and men are not."'68 In other
words, Justice Stewart was apparently saying that California's program was
not sexually discriminatory on its face since it excluded both men and women
from pregnancy disability coverage. In footnote 20, Justice Stewart further
explained:
[Tihis case is . . . a far cry from cases like Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v.
Richardson involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The California
insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender
but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable
disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification
like those considered in Reed and Frontiero. Normal pregnancy is an objectively
identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that
distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitu-
tionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as
this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this
insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides
potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.
While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.
supra note 62; Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications,'62 Geo. L.J. 1071 (1974); Com-
ment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 605
(1973); Johnston, supra note 28.
64. Sex has never been declared a suspect class by a majority of the Court; see Frontlero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The following classifications have been held to be suspect: race,
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); national origin, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475 (1954), and alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
65. See note 62 supra.
66. 417 U.S. at 496.
67. Id. at 496-97 n.20, see Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 97 S. Ct. 401, 407 (1976).
68. 417 U.S. at 496-97.
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The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both
sexes.
69
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Douglas, stated that the California program was sexually discriminatory.70 By
excluding normal pregnancy from its coverage, the program "created a double
standard for disability compensation:" men were covered for every disability
including those that are confined to their sex; women were not.7 ' Concluding
that "[s]uch dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical
characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex dis-
crimination,' 7 2 the dissent urged that the case be reviewed under the strict
scrutiny standard applicable to cases involving suspect classifications. 73
The post-Geduldig lower court cases brought under Title VII distinguished
Geduldig by focusing on the difference between statutory construction and
constitutional analysis. 74 It was reasoned that under Title VII Congress
intended to prohibit a broader range of sex discrimination than is prohibited
under the equal protection clause75 and is enabled to do so by its power to
enact legislation necessary and proper to regulate interstate commerce. 76 Title
VII was held to express a "flat ban" on sex discrimination7 7 in contrast to the
69. Id. at 496-97 n.20 (citations omitted). Classifications based on gender as such were defined
by Reed v. Reed as those which provide for "dissimilar treatment [of] men and women who are.
. similarly situated... ." 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971). Cases involving classifications based on gender
as such include: Craig v. Boren, 97 S. CL 451 (1976) (females between the ages of 18 and 21 were
permitted to purchase beer while males within the same age group were denied the privilege);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (widow with minor child received, under Social
Security Act, benefits based on deceased husband's earnings while widower with minor child
received no such benefits based on earnings of deceased wife); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975) (male naval officers were subject to mandatory discharge after 9 years of service
without having been promoted-female officers were entitled to 13 years); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974) (widows were granted property tax exemption, widowers were not); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (spouses of servicemen were automatically considered dependents
for purpose of entitlement to certain benefits while spouses of servicewomen had to prove actual
dependency).
70. Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 503.
74. E.g., Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 97 S. CL 806 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 725 (1977) (mem.); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519
F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. CL 401 (1976); Communications Workers v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 724 (1977) (mem.).
75. Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Iowa 1975).
76. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 806
(1977); Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787 (N.D. Iowa 1975). See
also Vineyard v. Hollister Elem. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580, 585 (N.D. Cal. 1974) ("implement-
ing legislation may reach more broadly than the equal protection clause itself).
77. The exceptions and defenses to sex discrimination are narrovr, see note 14 supra.
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balancing process required in constitutional analysis. 78 One court reasoned
further that Geduldig did not intend to invalidate the EEOC guidelines
without even referring to them or to Title VII.
7 9
Support for this position was found in the fact that the standards for
establishing sex discrimination under Title VII have been held to differ in an
important respect from equal protection standards. Geduldig's footnote 20
stated that neutral policies which adversely affect one sex may be shown to be
sexually discriminatory if proved to be "mere pretexts designed to effect an
invidious discrimination .... "80 Under Title VII, however, the courts relied
on Griggs v. Duke Power Company81 for the proposition that in a Title VII
action proof of discriminatory purpose is unnecessary because "discriminatory
impact alone establishes liability. 8 2
In General Electric Company v. Gilberts 3 the Supreme Court incorporated
the equal protection definition of sex discrimination as defined in Geduldig84
into the statutory provisions of Title VII. While recognizing that Congress
could have defined sex discrimination to reach conduct not proscribed by the
equal protection clause, the Court declined to so find in the absence of any
expression of congressional intent to do so.85
Geduldig had set forth two ways by which sex discrimination can be
established. First, a classification may be based on gender as such. Second, a
facially neutral classification may be shown to be a mere pretext designed to
effect an invidious discrimination.8 6 Applying these tests in a Title VII
context, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to establish that, by excluding
pregnancy, GE's plan discriminated against women on the basis of sex. 8 7
78. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401
(1976).
79. Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1030-31 n. 11 (2d
Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 724 (1977) (mem.).
80. 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974).
81. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See notes 101-03 infra and accompanying text.
82. Zichy v. City of Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 664 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976) ("the statute
looks to 'consequences,' not intent). See also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 417 &
n.7 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under Title VII, intentional action must be found before
injunctive relief may be granted. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1163
(W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 199 (1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737
(1976). "Mntentiona unfair employment practices are those engaged in deliberately and not
accidentally. No willfulness on the part of the employer need be shown. .. ." Id., quoting Kober
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1973).
83. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
84. 417 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974). The alignment of judges in Gilbert was precisely the same as
that in Geduldig except that Justice Stevens replaced Justice Douglas as one of the three
dissenters. The majority was composed of Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion, Chief
Justice Burger, Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun and Powell (Justices Blackmun and Stewart
filed separate concurring statements). Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. Justice Stevens
filed a separate dissenting opinion.
85. 97 S. Ct. at 407.
86. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
87. 97 S. Ct. at 407-08.
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On the reasoning of Geduldig, the exclusion of pregnancy from a disability
benefits plan was found not to be a per se violation of Title VII since it does
not remove anyone from eligibility for benefits under the plan on the basis of
gender.18 The exclusion of pregnancy benefits is therefore neutral.8 9 How-
ever, under the second test of sex discrimination set forth in Geduldig, a
classification which is not based on an explicit gender criterion may neverthe-
less be shown to be discriminatory by proof that the classification is a
subterfuge designed to effect an invidious discrimination. 90 In the instant case
the Court did not find evidence of a pretext to discriminate from the exclusion
of pregnancy because: 91
[W]e have here no question of excluding a disease or disability comparable in all other
respects to covered diseases or disabilities and yet confined to the members of one race
or sex. Pregnancy is of course confined to women, but it is in other ways significantly
different from the typical covered disease or disability .... [It is not a "disease" at all,
and is often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition .... 92
Thus, the Court appears to indicate that it would consider the exclusion of
sickle cell anemia racially discriminatory although it does not consider the
exclusion of pregnancy sexually discriminatory. 93
Evidence of a long history of GE practices was introduced to demonstrate
that GE's plan was not developed as a gender neutral assignment of risks.
Plaintiffs' evidence showed that at one time the plan was not offered to
women at all because it was thought that women were irresponsible and likely
to marry and leave the company. 94 The company had also pursued an overt
policy of maintaining women's wages at two-thirds the rate at which men
were compensated for similar work.9s Until approximately the time of the
commencement of the suit, GE imposed mandatory maternity leaves and
restrictions on employees' eligibility to return to work after childbirth. 96 The
district court, while deeming legally irrelevant GE's practices before the
88. Id. at 407.
89. Id. The dissent noted. "Surely it offends commonsense to suggest ... that a classification
revolving around pregnancy is not, at the minimum, strongly 'sex related.' "Id. at 414 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 407-08.
91. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976): "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts ... in the jury cases for
example, the total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires--may for
all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the
discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Id. at 242; "[WVlhen the
disproportion is as dramatic as in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 [(1960)], or Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [(1886)], it really does not matter whether the standard is phrased in terms
of purpose or effect." Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis deleted).
92. 97 S. CL at 408.
93. Justice Brennan stated that under the Court's analysis sickle-cell anemia "could be freely
excluded," id. at 416 n.5, but he seems to be referring only to the per se step of the Court's
analysis.
94. Id. at 415 & n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Id,
96. Id.
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enactment of Title VII, 97 did find that the company's "discriminatory at-
titude" was a "motivating factor in its policy." 98 The Supreme Court,
however, stated that plaintiffs had not proven discriminatory intent on the
part of GE. 99 In so holding, the Court implicitly rejected both plaintiffs'
evidence and the finding of the district court. 10 0 The Court gave no other
indication of what type of evidence would amount to a showing of discrimina-
tory intent or purpose.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 10 the Supreme Court had enunciated a third
method of proving discrimination applicable only to Title VII cases: In a Title
VII case a facially neutral plan could be shown to be a prima facie violation of
Title VII, irrespective of the lack of discriminatory motive, if it had the effect
of discriminating against a protected class.10 2 Then the burden shifted to the
employer to justify the plan on non-invidious grounds. 10 3 Citing Griggs, the
Fourth Circuit in Gilbert had deemed discriminatory intent irrelevant in a
Title VII action. 10 4 The Supreme Court, in reversing, briefly referred to the
Griggs decision but declined to decide whether or not its effect analysis was
applicable.' 05 The Court did say that even if the Griggs test were used, the
plan would still be upheld. In this step of its analysis, the Court focused on
the economic value of the plan as a whole to each sex rather than on the
pregnancy exclusion. Finding that this economic value was not proved to be
greater for men than women, the Court dismissed further inquiry into the
question of effect.' 0 6
Although the Court did not decide the question of whether Griggs was
applicable to the instant case, it cast doubt on its applicability and validity by
citing to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 107 and implying that that case
held to the contrary. 08 It is unclear, however, why McDonnell Douglas
97. 375 F. Supp. at 380.
98. 97 S. Ct. at 415 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F.
Supp. at 383.
99. 97 S. Ct. at 408.
100. Id. The majority opinion did not consider plaintiffs' evidence at all. The Court merely
concluded: "There is no more showing in this case than there was in Geduldig that the exclusion
of pregnancy benefits is a mere '[pretext] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex or the other.' " Id.
101. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
102. Id. at 429-33. In Griggs, a standardized test operated to exclude a large number of
blacks from employment. The Court found the test discriminatory without proof of discrimina-
tory intent on the ground that the test was not sufficiently related to job performance and
therefore excluded blacks who were capable of performing effectively.
103. Id.
104. 519 F.2d at 664 & n. 12. "It is of no moment that an employer may not have deliberately
intended sex-related discrimination; the statute looks to 'consequences,' not intent." Id. at 664.
105. 97 S. Ct. at 408-09.
106. Id. at 409. The Court implicitly rejected the type of effect argument mentioned at notes
135-37 infra and accompanying text.
107. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
108. 97 S. Ct. at 409. In citing to McDonnell Douglas the Court used a "but cf." signal,
signifying that the "[clited authority supports a proposition analogous to the contrary of the
position stated in the text." The Harvard Law Review Association, A Uniform System of Citation
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should be cited as in any way inconsistent with Griggs. Griggs stated that a
prima facie case could be established without a showing of discriminatory
intent.10 9 In McDonnell Douglas the plaintiff did prove a prima fade case
without showing discriminatory intent but his case was rebutted by the
employer's justification. 110 It was only at this point that discriminatory intent
was relevant to plaintiff's case: The burden shifted to the plaintiff to show
that the employer's asserted motive was a mere pretext to effect an invidious
discrimination. 111
The Court concluded that the plan covers the same categories of risk for
men and women. Pregnancy is an "additional risk, unique to women" which
may be excluded without resulting in disparity of coverage. 112 The EEOC
pregnancy guidelines, expressing a contrary position, were rejected." 13
7 (12th ed. 1976). Justices Stewart and Blackmun, concurring in separate opinions, disagreed
with each other on whether or not the majority opinion invalidated the Griggs effect test of
discrimination. Id. at 413.
109. See note 102 supra.
110. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas involved an employer's refusal to rehire a black
who had been laid off in a business slow down. The employer justified the refusal by the fact that
the employee had engaged in an illegal "stall-in" and "lock-in" to protest the layoff. Id. at 796,
801. The Court held that the employee had established a prima fade case of racial discrimination
by showing that he was a member of a racial minority and that he had been rejected for a
position for which he was qualified and which remained open. Id. at 802. However, the Court
found that the employer rebutted this prima fade case by basing its decision to fire the employee
on the plaintiff's deliberate unlawful activity directed against the employer. Id. at 803-04.
111. Id. at 805. The Eighth Circuit, interpreting McDonnell Douglas, stated: "Initially, the
plaintiff carries the burden of establishing a prima fade case of discrimination. The burden then
shifts to the employer to explain the action alleged to be discriminatory. Finally, the plaintiff
should have a fair opportunity to show that the reasons asserted by the defendant were merely a
pretext for discrimination." Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651, 652 (8th Cir.
1975).
112. 97 S. Ct. 409-10. Since comprehensive disability insurance coverage for women (preg-
nancy included) is more expensive than comprehensive coverage for men, the Court reasoned that
if sex discrimination occurs when an employer fails to cover pregnancy it also occurs when an
employer offers no disability plan at all-the decision not to provide disability coverage affects
women more than men. The Court stated that such a result would "endanger the common-sense
notion that an employer who has no disability benefits program at all does not violate Title VII
.. " Id. at 409-10 & n.17.
It was never contended by women employees that Title VII requires an employer to "offer any
particular disability benefits, in any specific amount, or of any particular duration. The only
requirement is that there be no inequality based on sex." Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F.
Supp. 1146, 1163 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). See notes 34-3S supra and accompanying text.
113. Id. at 410-13. The Court found that the EEOC guidelines were in conflict with: 1)
previous agency pronouncements (see note 23 supra and accompanying text); 2) Senator Hum-
phrey's remarks that the purpose of the Bennett Amendment to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h)(1970), quoted at note 14 supra, was "to make it 'unmistakably dear' that 'differences
of treatment in industrial benefit plans, including earlier retirement options for women, may
continue in operation under [Title VII].' " (citation omitted); 3) an interpretive regulation by the
Wage and Hour Administrator under the Equal Pay Act, 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d)(197S), stating
that in the area of insurance plans it is not sex discrimination if, with respect to each sex,
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. 14 Acknowledging
that Geduldig held that pregnancy classifications are not based on sex as such,
the dissent focused its criticism on the majority's handling of the discrimina-
tory motive and effect issues. 11s In view of the evidence of GE's historical
discrimination against women and the district court's finding of a "discrimina-
tory attitude," the dissent characterized as "fanciful" the majority's view that
GE's plan was the result of a gender neutral assignment of risks. 116 Rejecting
as "unexplained and inexplicable" the majority's suggestion that the Griggs
effect analysis may no longer be valid, 117 the dissent criticized the majority
for focusing on the inclusion of risks in GE's plan rather than on the plan's
sole exclusion-pregnancy benefits. 118 Since either approach was plausible,
the dissent believed that deference should have been accorded to the interpre-
tation of the EEOC, the agency charged by Congress to resolve precisely this
type of "complex economic and social inquiry." 119
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion stating that he would
not embody the traditional equal protection definition of discrimination into
the newer statutory mandate. 120
The Court's verbatim transposing of Geduldig into the employment context
makes it virtually impossible to prove that the exclusion of pregnancy from
fringe benefit plans violates Title VII. A disability plan would be held to be a
per se violation of Title VII (one in which the classification itself makes
distinctions on the basis of sex) only if it excluded women from benefits for a
non sex-unique disability-such as appendicitis-while providing such pay-
ments for men.1 2' Secondly, since the Court refused to infer a discriminatory
motive from a plan whose sole exclusion affects only women, it is hard to
conceive of a situation where motive would be inferred. Finally, since the
Court did not even refer to the evidence of GE's past discrimination, one must
wonder what evidence would be sufficient to prove discriminatory intent on
the part of an employer.
As is always the difficulty with showing intent, it is the employer, not the
employee, who is best able to explain the reasons for particular practices and
policies.1 22 For this reason, the effect analysis of Griggs was of great value in
employer contributions are equal although benefits are unequal, or employer contributions are
unequal but resulting benefits are equal. 97 S. Ct. at 411-12.
114. 97 S. Ct. at 413 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 414-15.
116. Id. at 414.
117. Id. at 417.
118. Id. at 417-18.
119. Id. at 418.
120. Id. at 420-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found GE's plan sexually
discriminatory by focusing on the capacity of women to become pregnant. Id.
121. Exclusion of a sex-unique disability would merely remove a condition from coverage; It
would not eliminate anyone from eligibility on the basis of gender. Id. at 407, quoting Geduldig's
footnote 20. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
122. But see, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring):
"Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually
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combatting less overt forms of discrimination in employment. 1 3 During oral
argument of Gilbert, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Griggs effect
analysis was limited to testing cases. 124 If a majority of the Court is in
agreement, much of the value of Title VII may be destroyed for all work-
ers. 125
Under the Gilbert reasoning, cases involving pregnancy and sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII would seem to present a distinction between a situation
in which pregnancy is used as a justification for disparate treatment of women
generally and one in which the fact of pregnancy triggers disparate treatment.
The first category encompasses an employment practice which excludes all
women from employment on the ground that some may become pregnant,
1 26
or one that provides for discharge of women upon marriage on the assumption
that they are likely to become pregnant. 2 7 This classification discriminates
against women on the basis of gender as such. In the second category are
happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally
the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds."
123. E.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, 395 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(height requirements); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.RtD. 98 (W.D. Ky. 1973), modified on
other grounds, 510 F.2d 939 (1975) (weight requirements). See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S.
CL 401, 417 n.7 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) for a list of court of appeals cases applying the
Griggs "disparate impact" theory.
124. Arguments Before the Court, 45 U.S.L.W. 3296, 3298 (Oct. 19, 1976).
125. It should be noted that the Court has insisted on a showing of discriminatory motive in
several recent cases brought under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See ML Healthy City
School Dist- v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington v.
Davis, black applicants for jobs as District of Columbia police officers challenged a personnel test
as violative of the equal protection guarantee contained in the fifth amendment due process
clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and D.C. Code § 1-320. Id. at 233. The district court upheld the test,
finding that it was related to the job training program and noting that the department's
affirmative efforts to recruit blacks indicated a lack of discriminatory intent. Id. at 234-36. The
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, relying on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
which held that in a Title VII action a test which operated to exclude minorities was discrimina-
tory unless the employer was able to prove the test was substantially related to job performance.
426 U.S. at 236-37. The court held that in view of the fact that four times as many blacks as
whites failed the test, lack of discriminatory intent was irrelevant. Id. The court invalidated the
test since the department could not show that the test was related to job performance and not
merely to job training. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred
in applying Title VII standards to a constitutional challenge under the equal protection compo-
nent of the due process clause. Id. at 238. Disapproving of contrary language in previous cases,
id. at 242-45, and lower court cases which had disregarded discriminatory purpose, id. at 244 &
n.12, the Court stated. "[Olur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official
act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." Id. at 239 (emphasis deleted).
126. Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754, 760 (M.D. Ala.
1969).
127. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1207 n.23 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
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cases like Gilbert, where it is not until a women is pregnant that she is treated
differently from her male counterparts. In the Court's view, these cases do not
involve sex discrimination.
Under Title VII, married women are protected, 128 mothers are pro-
tected,' 29 but the status of pregnant women has been thrown into doubt.
Armed with the Act, the federal courts have prevented practices which punish
pregnancy in every aspect of employment: discharge because of pregnancy;130
forced maternity leaves beginning and ending at arbitrary dates; 1 3 1 loss of
pension, vacation and seniority; 132 denial of sick leave 133 and disability
benefits for the duration of pregnancy-related disabilities. 134 If the Gilbert
128. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
129. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). Phillips, the only
Title VII case to reach the Supreme Court before Gilbert, had presented the Court with a
classification which encompassed only a portion of the protected class (sex) since It was based on
sex plus another criterion. The challenged employment practice was refusal to hire women with
pre-school age children while hiring similarly situated men. Id. at 543. Using what was termed a
"sex plus" theory, 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (Brown, C.J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that a per se violation of
Title VII must be based solely on sex. 411 F.2d 1, 3-4 (5th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded for consideration of a BFOQ defense, see note 14 supra, holding that the
employment policy constituted sex discrimination violative of Title VII by providing for disparate
treatment of male and female parents of pre-school age children. 400 U.S. at 543-44. Thus, at
least in a case where the additional criterion did not involve a sex-unique characteristic, the Court
rejected the acceptability of using a sex plus classification as a means of avoiding the require-
ments of Title VII.
130. Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975); Polston v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 11 F.E.P.C. 380 (W.D. Ky. 1975). Cf. Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 333 F.
Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971) (dismissal because of unwed pregnancy).
131. Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F. 2d 1208, 1209-10 n.1 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Vineyard v. Hollister Elem. School Dist.,
64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
132. Zichy v. City of Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Healen v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 8 F.E.P.C. 917 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
133. Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 806 (1977); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 725 (1977) (mem.); Guse v. J.C. Penny, Co., 409 F.
Supp. 28 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Zichy v. City of Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Sale
v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Vineyard v. Hollister
Elem. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Seaman v. Spring Lake Park Indep. School
Dist. No. 16, 387 F. Supp. 1168 (D. Minn. 1974); Fakras v. South W. City School Dist., 8
F.E.P.C. 288 (S.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974); Healen v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 8 F.E.P.C. 917 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
134. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 806
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decision means that practices singling out pregnancy for special treatment do
not constitute sex discrimination absent actual proof of discriminatory motive,
the Court vitiates all the protection heretofore accorded pregnant workers
under Title VII.
Furthermore, a classification involving pregnancy affects all women, not
only those who are pregnant at a given time. 135 The capacity to bear children
is a basic characteristic of the female sex and is a primary basis for the
stereotyped distinctions between male and female roles. ' 36 It has been pointed
out that pregnancy classifications in employment reinforce societal pressure to
conform to these traditional roles and may even deter women from entering
the labor force. 137
At base, the question of whether the scope of Title VII's sex discrimination
prohibition encompasses pregnancy is one of statutory construction. By
removing pregnancy disability benefits from the realm of sex discrimination,
the Court has at least quashed any argument that coverage of pregnancy
constitutes reverse discrimination against men. 38 It is clear that Congress is
constitutionally free to require employers to provide pregnancy disability
coverage, and, more broadly, to treat pregnancy as any other disability in
employment practices and policies. 139 The Supreme Court has overruled the
unanimous holding of the courts of appeals which have considered the
question,1 40 by holding that this was not Congress' intent. In contrast, the
New York Court of Appeals, in Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York
(1977); Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 724 (1977) (mem.); Wetzel v. liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d
199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). See also Guse v. J.C.
Penney Co., 409 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (denial of group medical insurance benefits).
135. The district court expressed this view when it determined the class composition on the
issue of whether GE violated Title VII by its failure to pay disability benefits. The court did not
limit the class to GE employees who had become or were pregnant at the time of suit. Instead,
the court held that the class action could be maintained on behalf of a class composed of all
female employees of GE. The court reasoned that "[t]he pregnancy benefit exclusion applies
equally to all women employees" and that all female employees of GE have "a stake in the
outcome of this litigation." Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267, 272-73 (E.D. Va. 1973).
136. Comment, supra note 48, at 458.
137. The Uniqueness Trap, supra note 55, at 1532.
138. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
139. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court expressly stated that "lawmakers
are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy" in disability insurance programs. Id. at
496-97 n.20. Congress has required like treatment of pregnancy and illness in other contexts. In
1968 Congress amended the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act of 1946 to include within the
meaning of a day of sickness "a calendar day on which, because of pregnancy, miscarriage, or the
birth of a child, (i) [a female employee] is unable to work or (ii) working would be injurious to her
health." 45 U.S.C. § 351(k)(2)(1970). In addition, in 1972 Congress approved a Department of
Health, Education and Welfare promulgation substantially identical to the EEOC pregnancy
guideline under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97
S. Ct. 401, 419 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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State Human Rights Appeal Board, 141 has recently reaffirmed its construction
of language substantially identical to Title VII contained in New York's
Human Rights Law, 14 2 as meaning that employers must treat pregnancy like
other temporary disabilities to avoid sex discrimination. 143 It is now Congress'
responsibility to clarify its intention with respect to pregnancy coverage in
fringe benefit programs and the many arbitrary practices which set up
obstacles to womens' employment by penalizing an inherently female and
socially useful function.
Helen Hadjiyannakis
Constitutional Law-Supreme Court Limits Applicability of Miranda
by Narrowing the Definition of "Custodial Interrogation."-Respondent
Carl Mathiason was charged with burglary. At trial it appeared that a woman
living in the burglarized house had told a state police officer that she
suspected Mathiason, a parolee on supervision. Approximately twenty-five
days after the burglary, the officer left a note at respondent's apartment
asking him to call. When Mathiason called, the officer suggested they meet at
the state police office, and respondent acquiesced. When he arrived, the
officer ushered Mathiason into an office and closed the door. The officer told
Mathiason that he was not under arrest, but was suspected of involvement in
the burglary and that truthfulness would be to his advantage. The officer also
141. 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976).
142. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976): "It shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice... [f]or an employer... because of the... sex ... of an individual...
to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment." Compare Title Vfl's language, quoted in note 12 supra.
143. 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976). The court has so held In the
context of public employment since 1974. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 22 v.
New York State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 677, 319 N.E.2d 203, 360 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1974); Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 2 v. New York State Div. of Human
Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 673, 319 N.E.2d 202, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974); Union Free School Dist. No.
6 v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371, 320 N.E.2d 859,.362 N.Y.S.2d
139 (1974). The Brooklyn Gas case is significant because the court declined to follow Gilbert and
because the court did not exempt private employers from the requirements of the Human Rights
Law (HRL), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (McKinney 1972), as amended (McKlnney Supp.
1976), despite an apparent conflict with the Disability Benefits Law (DBL), N.Y. Workmen's
Comp. Law § 200 et. seq. (McKinney 1965), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976). The DBL,
which requires private employers to provide minimum nonoccupational illness and accident
benefits, expressly excludes benefits for the duration of any pregnancy-related disability. Id. §
205(3). In reconciling the two statutes the court used the concept of "skew lines"-nonparallel
lines which are on different planes and therefore never intersect. 41 N.Y.2d at 88, 359 N.E.2d at
396, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 887. Noting that the Gilbert decision "while instructive, is not binding on
our court," Id. at 86 n.1, 359 N.E.2d at 395 n.1, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 886 n.1, the court reasoned:
"In sum, the DBL and the HRL each lay down minimum demands on employers. Whichever
statute imposes the greater obligation is the one which becomes operative. In the cases before us It
is the HRL." Id. at 88, 359 N.E.2d at 397, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
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falsely stated that Mathiason's fingerprints had been found at the scene of the
burglary. Faced with this, respondent confessed within a few minutes. The
officer then gave respondent the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona'
and took a taped confession. Afterwards, the officer advised Mathiason that
he would not be arrested and was free to leave. The entire interview lasted no
more than half an hour. Mathiason moved to suppress evidence of his
confession but the trial court admitted it and respondent was convicted of
burglary in the first degree. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction2 but the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed, holding that the
confession was the product of "custodial interrogation" since it had taken
place in a "coercive environment", and was therefore inadmissible in the
absence of prior Miranda warnings.3 The United States Supreme Court
reversed summarily, holding that the confession did not result from "custodial
interrogation" since Mathiason was not "in custody or 'otherwise deprived of
his freedom in any significant way.' " Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711
(1977) (per curiam).4
This Note will first give a short explanation of Miranda v. Arizonas and
then briefly trace a series of Supreme Court cases limiting6 or refusing to
extend7 the mandate of that decision.8 Several cases based on facts similar to
those of Mathiason will be examined in an attempt to assess the impact of
that decision on the Miranda doctrine of "custodial interrogation."
The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that "No person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ....9
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 22 Ore. App. 494, 539 P.2d 1122 (Ct. App. 1975).
3. 275 Ore. 1, 549 P.2d 673 (1976).
4. Three Justices dissented. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented from the summary disposition of
the case and would have set it for oral argument. 97 S. Ct. 711, 714 (1977) (per curiam). Mr.
Justice Stevens also dissented from the summary disposition and filed a separate opinion. Id. at
716. Mr. Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the majority opinion was "contrary to
the rationale" of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Id. at 714.
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. See notes 34-59 infra and accompanying text.
7. See note 34 infra.
8. The erosion of Miranda has not been exclusively the result of judicial activity. Shortly after
Miranda was decided, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970) was enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act. Section 3501 effected a partial overruling of Miranda by, in effect,
mandating a return to the old voluntariness test in federal cases. See notes 10-12 infra and
accompanying text. Section 3501(a) provides that in federal prosecutions a confession "shall be
admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1970). Section 3501(b)
provides, in part, that whether a defendant was advised of his rights is to be taken into
consideration in determining voluntariness. The absence of warnings, however, "need not be
conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession." Id. § 3501(b). See Note, Judicial
Legerdemain: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Pulled from Miranda's Hat, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 425 (1973). For
an important decision upholding the constitutionality of § 3501, see United States v. Crocker, 510
F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
9. U.S. Const. amend. V. The fifth amendment applies to the states through the due process
clanse of the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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The traditional test for determining the admissibility of a confession focused
on its voluntariness.10 Voluntariness was to be determined from the totality of
the facts and circumstances.11 However, in Escobedo v. Illinois,12 the Su-
preme Court indicated a willingness to dispense with detailed examinations of
voluntariness, holding that confessions obtained in cases where a defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated were to be automatically
excluded. 13 In Miranda v. Arizona,14 the Court established a detailed set of
procedural guidelines' s for the protection of a suspect's fifth amendment rights
during "custodial interrogation," violation of which would render any confes-
sion or other statement inadmissible per se. Briefly stated, the court held that:
[TJhe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.' 6
Thus the key question in determining the applicability of Miranda is whether
the accused has been subjected to "custodial interrogation."'17 In resolving this
question the totality of the facts and circumstances must be considered.' 8
10. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958);
White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
11. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440-41
(1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322-23
(1959).
12. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
13. The Court held that a violation occurs where the investigation "has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and
been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent ... " Id. at 490-91.
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
16. Id. (footnote omitted). In what has been called "the infamous 'obfuscating footnote' ";
Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interroga-
tion?, 25 S.C.L. Rev. 699, 707 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Smith); the Court added: "This Is what
we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused." 384
U.S. at 444 n.4 (italics omitted); see note 13 supra. However, it is now clear that the Miranda test
for custodial interrogation has superseded the focus test of Escobedo. See note 24 infra.
17. For detailed treatments of this question see Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?":
California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 I.C.L.A.L. Rev. 59 (1966)
(hereinafter cited as Graham); Smith, supra note 16; Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). The broad
question of what constitutes "custodial interrogation" is beyond the scope of this Note. It should
be noted, however, that Miranda does not apply to "(gleneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process. .... "
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
18. See United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970);
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There is no general rule for determining when questioning becomes "custodial,"
but some-of the more important circumstances may be classified under the
following general headings: the time,1 9 place, 20 length, 21 and form22 of the
questions; the nature of the interrogation; 23 whether the investigation has
focused on the accused;24 the condition of the person being interrogated; 2s and
whether the objective indicia of arrest are present. 2 6 One court has divided
the overall inquiry in approaching any Miranda problem into four distinct
questions: (1) was there custody? (2) was the statement made in response to
interrogation? (3) if the answer to both (1) and (2) is affirmative, were there
adequate warnings? (4) if the answer to (3) is yes, was there an adequate
waiver?2 7
In determining whether a particular interrogation 28 is "custodial" most
State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168, 177, 329 A.2d 75, 79 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 267,
337 A.2d 371 (1975) (per curiam).
19. Questioning that takes place late at night or in the early morning is more likely to be
found "custodial" than routine daylight questioning. See Cummings v. State, 27 Md. App. 361,
372-73, 341 A.2d 294, 302 (1975).
20. Questioning at the police station is much more likely to be found "custodial" than
questioning elsewhere. Smith, supra note 16, at 723. Some cases have expressly held that all
station house questioning is "custodial interrogation." E.g., United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d
373, 376 (4th Cir. 1968); State v. Vining, 2 Wash. App. 802, 806, 472 P.2d S64, 567 (1970).
Professor Graham initially adopted this position. See Graham, supra note 17, at 82-83. However,
this approach has been rejected and it is now dear that not all interrogation at the police station
is "custodial." State v. Luoma, 14 Wash. App. 705, 711, 544 P.2d 770, 774-75 (1976); see Smith,
supra note 16, at 723-32.
21. The longer the questioning the more likely it is to be found "custodial." People v. Herdan,
42 Cal. App. 3d 300, 307 n.12, 116 Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 n.12 (2d Dist. 1974).
22. Id.
23. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 578 (1970).
24. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 n.4 (1966). The Michigan Supreme Court has
adopted the focus tesL People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 357 & n.6, 224 N.W.2d 867, 874 & n.6,
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975). However, most jurisdictions now recognize that the old focus
test of Escobedo (see note 13 supra) has been superseded by the concept of "custodial interroga-
tion." Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974);
United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970);
Cummings v. State, 27 Md. App. 361, 379, 341 A.2d 294, 306 (1975).
25. Thus, the suspect's physical and mental condition or his knowledge and intelligence
occasionally appear to have been considered as factors bearing on the suspect's susceptibility to
intimidation. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 577-78 (1970).
26. Cummings v. State, 27 Md. App. 361, 374-75, 341 A.2d 294, 303-04 (1975). For
discussion of all the factors, see generally, Graham, supra note 17, at 78-117; Smith, supra note
16, at 714-32; Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 577-78 (1970). Professor Smith has classified the cases
according to the place of the interrogation, dividing them into cases of (1) on-the-scene interroga-
tion; (2) interrogation in the suspectfs home or at his place of business; and (3) interrogation at the
police station. This third category he in turn divides into three subcategories: (a) the person who
voluntarily appears at the station without encouragement; (b) the person who is already in
custody on another charge; and (c) the person who is asked or invited to the station by the police
or who is told that he may leave at any time. Cases involving fact patterns which do not fall
within this third sub-category are generally beyond the scope of this Note.
27. Cummings v. State, 27 Md. App. 361, 367, 341 A.2d 294, 299 (1975).
28. For purposes of this Note, it shall be assumed that the examples of police questioning
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courts have adopted an objective test. Thus, if a person is questioned under
circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that he has
been taken into custody, or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
some significant way, the Miranda rules will attach.
29
The rationale of the Miranda decision appears to be that the fifth amend-
ment requires that a confession be the product of free choice. 30 In Miranda,
the Court found that the process of custodial interrogation "contains inher-
ently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to
resist and . . . compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely."'3 1 It therefore held that warnings were required "to dispel the compul-
sion inherent in custodial surroundings ... .
Subsequently, in Orozco v. Texas, 33 the warning requirements were held
applicable to a police interrogation in the accused's home. However, recent
Supreme Court decisions have shown a tendency towards limiting Miranda's
reach. 34 Thus, in Harris v. New York, 3s the Court held that statements
discussed constitute "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. For a general discussion of
what is "interrogation" see Graham, supra note 17, at 92-112. It should be noted, however, that
warnings are not required where an accused volunteers evidence of his guilt. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
29. People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 448, 426 P.2d 515, 521, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 121 (1967)
(en bane); People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967). "[C]ustody
occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led
to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived." Id. at 9, 233 N.E.2d at 260, 286
N.Y.S.2d at 233. It has been pointed out, however, that use of a subjective test would be more
logical since the fifth amendment privilege is designed to protect a person against compelled
self-incrimination. Thus, "the person who honestly but unreasonably thinks he is under arrest has
been subjected to precisely the same custodial pressures as the person whose belief in this regard
is reasonable." LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and
Beyond, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 39, 105 (1968). However, it seems clear that such a test would present
difficult problems of proof. See United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970). For a case suggesting that the accused's subjective feeling is to be
considered see Hicks v. United States, 382 F.2d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also Myers v.
State, 3 Md. App. 534, 240 A.2d 288 (1968) (custody occurs if defendant's subjective belief that
his freedom of action is restricted is reasonable). The New York Court of Appeals has adopted
the objective standard of "a reasonable man, innocent of any crime. . . ." People v. Yuld, 25
N.Y.2d 585, 589, 256 N.E.2d 172, 174, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851
(1970). For a brief review of some of the different approaches see State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J.
Super. 168, 176 n.1, 329 A.2d 75, 79 n.1 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd 67 N.J. 267, 337 A.2d 371 (1975)
(per curiam).
30. 384 U.S. at 458. " '[A] confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever
may have been the character of the compulsion ... .' "Id. at 462, quoting Wan v. United States,
266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924).
31. 384 U.S. at 467.
32. Id. at 458.
33. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
34. The Court has also refused opportunities to broadly extend the Miranda doctrine. E.g.,
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (Miranda warnings not required to be given
grand jury witness before testifying to criminal activities in which he may have been involved);
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obtained in the absence of proper Miranda warnings are admissible to
impeach a defendant's credibility once he has taken the stand. 36 In Michigan
v. Tucker,3 7 the police failed to inform the accused of his right to appointed
counsel and he subsequently made a statement which led the police to a
witness who incriminated him.38 Despite the fact that this evidence was
obtained in violation of the Miranda guidelines, the Supreme Court found it
admissible by drawing a sharp distinction between actual violations of an
accused's fifth amendment rights and violations of the "prophylactic rules" 39
which Miranda had promulgated to protect those rights. The Court referred
to the Miranda warnings as merely "recommended 'procedural safe-
guards.' "40
In Miranda, it was said that if the defendant "states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 4' Yet, in
Oregon v. Hass,4 2 the Court, relying on Harris, found admissible for im-
peachment purposes an accused's statements made after a request to consult
with a lawyer.4 3 The Court held that inadmissibility under these circum-
stances would pervert a "constitutional right into a right to falsify free from
the embarrassment of impeachment evidence . .. .,4
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657-58 (1976) (Miranda not applicable to disclosures by
taxpayer on his income tax return).
35. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
36. The Court found statements obtained in violation of Miranda admissible to impeach
despite the following language in Miranda: "[S]tatements. . . intended to be exculpatory by the
defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial .... These statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings
and effective waiver required for any other statement." 384 U.S. at 477. In Harris, the majority
regarded these "comments" as "not at all necessary" to the decision in the case and therefore not
controlling. 401 U.S. at 224. For a strong criticism of Harris see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v.
New York. Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority, 80 Yale L.J. 1198, 1199 (1971).
37. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
38. Id. at 436-37.
39. Id. at 439.
40. Id. at 443. This reasoning seems difficult to reconcile with the statement in Miranda that
"[the requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation."
384 U.S. at 476.
41. Id. at 474.
42. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
43. The statements were made in the arresting officer's patrol car. The officer stated that the
defendant could telephone an attorney as soon as they got to the police station. Id. at 715-16.
44. Id. at 723. Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent points out that the decision leaves the police
with little incentive to obey firanda's requirement that interrogation cease when an accused asks
to see an attorney. If the requirement is disobeyed the police may obtain impeachment evidence,
while if it is followed the police will get nothing since the lawyer will almost certainly advise the
accused to remain silent. Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority found this "possibil-
ity" to be "speculative." Id. at 723.
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United States v. Hale4 S involved the question of whether an accused's
silence during police questioning may be used to impeach his testimony at
trial. The Court affirmed a reversal of respondent's conviction, but only on the
narrow evidentiary ground that the probative value of his silence was greatly
outweighed by the prejudice resulting from its admission.46 Subsequently, in
Doyle v. Ohio,47 a decision demonstrating that Miranda still has some vitality,
the Court held the use of post-arrest silence against a criminal defendant for
impeachment purposes violative of due process. 48
The next major decision affecting Miranda was Michigan v. Mosley 49
which involved a suspect's right to cut off questioning. Miranda states that if
a defendant "indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease."50
Mosley was arrested for robbery, given his Miranda warnings, and, when he
refused to answer any questions, the interrogation was immediately halted.
Two hours later he was again informed of his rights and questioned about a
robbery-murder not previously mentioned. At this point he made an in-
criminating statement which was admitted at his trial.51 The Supreme Court
found that Mosley's rights had not been violated by the resumption of
questioning. The Court reasoned that while Miranda states that interrogation
must be halted at the request of the accused, it does not indicate under what
circumstances questioning can be resumed.5 2 The Court concluded that the
admissibility of statements made by an accused after his decision to remain
silent "depends under Miranda on whether his 'right to cut off questioning'
was 'scrupulously honored.' ",S3 The dissenters argued that the majority
opinion signaled a "rejection of Miranda's basic premise. 5 4
Beckwith v. United States5s has recently clarified the threshold requirement
that the interrogation be "custodial" before Miranda applies. Beckwith holds
that a special agent of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service investigating a taxpayer's criminal liability for income tax violations,
need not give Miranda warnings before questioning where the taxpayer is not
45. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
46. Id. at 173. One Justice noted that defendant, while told of his right to remain silent, "was
not informed here that his silence . . . could be used against him at trial. Indeed, anyone would
reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be the case." Id. at 183 (White,
J., concurring).
47. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
48. Id. at 619. The Court quoted approvingly from Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion In
Hale. Id. See note 46 supra.
49. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
50. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
51. 423 U.S. at 97-98.
52. Id. at 101.
53. Id. at 104.
54. Id. at 118 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority view rep-
resented an implicit rejection of Miranda's "virtually irrebuttable presumption of compulsion" In a
custodial atmosphere. Id. at 114. "In formulating its procedural safeguard, the Court skirts the
problem of compulsion and thereby fails to join issue with the dictates of Miranda." Id.
55. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
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yet in custody.5 6 The Court repeatedly stressed the requirement of custody,57
and concluded that since the defendant was not physically in custody
Miranda did not apply.5 8 Since Miranda was inapplicable, the admissibility
of defendant's pre-trial statements was governed by the older and more
lenient voluntariness standard.5 9
The language of Miranda, however, is expressly not limited to situations
where the accused is in custody. Rather, interrogation is deemed custodial
where the defendant is in "custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. °6 0 Beckwith appears to hint that absent actual
police custody, the Court will not look closely for other significant depriva-
tions of freedom. 6 1 Oregon v. Mathiason not only strengthens this conclusion,
but additionally indicates that the Court will construe "custody" quite nar-
rowly.
In Mathiason, the Supreme Court of Oregon had found Miranda applica-
ble since the defendant, a parolee under supervision, 62 had been questioned at
56. Id. at 347-48.
57. Id. at 344-48.
58. Id. Defendant was interviewed at his home and place of employment. At no time was he
physically restrained and before questioning him the special agents read him a warning from a
printed card. However, the warning was defective under Miranda since it failed to apprise
defendant of his right to appointed counsel. Id. at 343.
59. "[N]oncustodial interrogation might possibly in some situations, by virtue of some special
circumstances, be characterized as one where 'the behavior of ... law enforcement officials was
such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-
determined .... " Id. at 347-48. The Court was quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 36S U.S. 534,
544 (1961), a pre-Miranda case applying the old voluntariness test.
60. Mfiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341, 350 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
This becomes clearer from an examination of the two cases cited by the dissent, United States v.
Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974) and United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir.
1969). Dickerson was squarely overruled in Beckwith. See Beckwith v. United States, 42S U.S.
341, 342 (noting that the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits had all reached results contrary to Dickerson). Dickerson had held that the rationale of
Mranda required that warnings "be given to the taxpayer . . . at the inception of the first
contact with the taxpayer after the case has been transferred to the Intelligence Division." 413
F.2d at 1116-17. Oliver, while not expressly overruled by Beckwith, was severely undercut by it.
United States v. Dreske, 536 F.2d 188, 195 (7th Cir. 1976). In Oliver it was stated that "[tlhe
application of Miranda does not turn on such a simple axis as whether or not the suspect is in
custody when he is being questioned. As the Court repeatedly indicated, the prescribed warnings
are required if the defendant is in custody 'or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way .... [Ihe test serves the purpose 'of determining when the adversary process
has begun, i.e., when the investigative machinery of the government is directed toward the
ultimate conviction of a particular individual and, when, therefore, a suspect should be advised
of his rights.' " 505 F.2d at 304-05. Mhile Oliver may be distinguished from Beckwith since the
accused in Oliver was arguably physically in custody, the above statement can no longer be
regarded as the law in light of Beckwith and Mathiason.
62. In Mathiason, Mr. justice Stevens dissented on the ground that "the issues presented by
this case are too important to be decided summarily." 97 S. CL at 716. Stevens found "the fact
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police headquarters behind closed doors after being told he was a suspect63
and that there was evidence which strongly incriminated him.64 These factors
led the court to the conclusion that Mathiason had been questioned in a
"coercive environment. '65 Thus, admission of his confession was "contrary to
the rationale expressed in Miranda.'66 The Oregon court did not find that
Mathiason was in custody at the time of his interrogation. In its per curiam
reversal, the Supreme Court stated that:
[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply
because a reviewing court concludes that ... the questioning took place in a "coercive
environment" .... Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a
restriction on a person's freedom as to render him "in custody." It was that sort of
coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to
which it is limited.
67
The Court appears to be stating expressly, and for the first time, that
Miranda is limited to situations where an accused is interrogated after an
that the respondent was on parole at the time of his interrogation in the police station" to be
particularly important. Id.
63. Thus, Mr. Justice Marshall felt that the investigation had already focused on the accused.
Id. at 715 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Mathiason was falsely informed that his fingerprints had been found at the scene of the
burglary. The United States Supreme Court found this to have "nothing to do with whether
respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule." Id. at 714, Mr. Justice Marshall
seemed to find the fact that "respondent was subjected to some of the 'deceptive stratagems,'
which called forth the Miranda decision" (id. at 715 (Marshall, J., dissenting) to be relevant to
whether Miranda was applicable. This treatment points up the divergent approaches taken by the
majority and Justice Marshall's dissent. For the majority, the issue was simply whether
Mathiason was in custody. Justice Marshall viewed the issue as whether the policies and
reasoning which underlay Miranda mandated its applicability to the circumstances of respon-
dent's confession.
65. "We hold the interrogation took place in a 'coercive environment.' The parties were In the
offices of the State Police; they were alone behind closed doors; the officer informed the defendant
he was a suspect in a theft and the authorities had evidence incriminating him in the crime; and
the defendant was a parolee under supervision. We are of the opinion that this evidence Is not
overcome by the evidence that the defendant came to the office in response to a request and was
told he was not under arrest." State v. Mathiason, 275 Ore. 1, -, 549 P.2d 673, 675 (1976).
66. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court found authority for its "coercive environment" formula In
State v. Travis, 250 Ore. 213, 441 P.2d 597 (1968) (en banc). This reliance is peculiar to say the
least. In Travis, Miranda was found to be inapplicable because the accused was not in custody.
The court went on to state that: "If, in fact, there is no custody, there is no danger that a coercive
environment will be created." Id. at 217, 441 p.2d at 599. Thus, if the Oregon court Intended to
follow the strict language of Travis, it should have held Miranda inapplicable in Mathiason since
there was no finding that defendant was in custody.
67. 97 S. Ct. at 714. Another possible reading of Mathiason is that the language limiting
Miranda's applicability to situations where the accused is actually in custody is mere erroneous
dictum since the Court did hold that under the circumstances, "Mathiason was not in custody 'or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' " Id. In light of the Court's
past decisions, however, and considering the general tenor of the Mathiason opinion it would
not seem likely that the quoted language was accidental.
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actual arrest and is not to be applied where the accused is not in custody but
is merely otherwise deprived of freedom in some significant way. Thus, taken
in conjunction with Beckwith, 6s Mathiason appears to write one half of the
definition of custodial interrogation out of Miranda. In his dissent, Mr.
Justice Stevens pointed out:
Miranda teaches that even if a suspect is not in custody, warnings are necessary if he is
"otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." If a parolee being
questioned in a police station is not described by that language, today's decision
qualifies that part of Miranda to some extent.69
It would certainly appear that a parolee requested to appear for questioning
could reasonably believe that he was not free to refuse the invitation." °
Mathiason must also be taken as an indication that the Court intends to
read the custody requirement somewhat narrowly. Since a parolee is legally in
custody for the term of his sentence, it is arguable that he should be so
considered for purposes of Miranda.71
Unfortunately, prior state and lower federal court decisions considering the
question of whether a suspect invited to the stationhouse by the police for
questioning is subjected to "custodial interrogation" are in some confusion.
The decisions lack consistency because each case turns on a peculiar set of
facts and circumstances and the weight assigned a particular circumstance is
likely to vary with the facts as well as with the jurisdiction. It is clear,
however, that several cases have failed to find police questioning custodial in
far grosser circumstances. 7 2 One commentator has pointed out that "[tihe
single area of the law in which the purposes of Miranda have been most
subverted, if not ignored, is that of the individual who is 'invited' to come in
for questioning." 73 A brief review of the cases confirms this conclusion.
The New York courts appear particularly reluctant to find interrogation
68. 425 U.S. 341 (1976), discussed in notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
69. 97 S. CL at 716. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "I believe we would have a better under-
standing of the extent of that qualification, and therefore of the situations in which warnings must
be given to a suspect who is not technically in custody, if we had the benefit of full argument and
plenary consideration." Id.
70. See id. at 714-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is important to point out that under the
objective test there is no requirement that the accused actually believe he was not free to refuse so
long as he could so believe as a reasonable man. People v. Herdan, 42 Cal. App.3d 300, 308 n. 13,
116 Cal. Rptr. 641, 646 n.13 (2d Dist. 1974).
71. Mr. Justice Stevens found Mathiason's status as a parolee particularly important.
Although he argued that this fact could cut both ways, Stevens stated: "IA] parolee is technically
in legal custody continuously until his sentence has been served. Therefore, if a formalistic
analysis of the custody question is to determine when the Miranda warning is necessary, a parolee
should always be warned." 97 S. CL at 716 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., People v. Burris, 49 Ill.2d 98, 273 N.E.2d 605 (1971) (questioning of defendant
held noncustodial where police had already found victim's body in defendant's car and had
witnesses who could place him at the site of the murder at the time it occurred); People v. Yukl,
25 N.Y.2d 585, 256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970); see
notes 74-78 infra and accompanying text.
73. Smith, supra note 16, at 735.
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custodial. Thus, in People v. Yukl, 74 a case of sodomy-murder, defendant and
his wife were asked to accompany the police to the stationhouse at 1:30 in the
morning. At the station defendant was questioned for four hours, was denied
permission to see his wife, and was not advised of his constitutional rights
until, during the course of an apparent strip search, the police noticed brown
stains on his undershorts and genitals. 7 5 Despite the obviously coercive
aspects of the interrogation, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's determination that defendant was not in custody until advised of his
rights.7 6 Three judges joined in a strong dissent. 77 In fact, the case appears to
represent a masked rejection of Miranda and a sub silentio application of the
old voluntariness standard. The Court of Appeals repeatedly stressed the trial
court's conclusion that defendant had responded to police requests "voluntar-
ily. 1"7 Under Miranda, however, the voluntariness of an accused's statements
is not determinative. Miranda expressly states that confessions which were
voluntary under the traditional standard might well be inadmissible under its
guidelines. 79 In Yukl, however, the Court of Appeals appeared to reason that
because defendant's statements were voluntary they could not have resulted
from custodial interrogation.
At the other extreme, several early cases state that all station house ques-
tioning is custodial interrogation.8 " Obviously, this is no longer the law.8 '
Burton v. State8 2 is a case which falls somewhere between these extremes.
In Burton defendant returned a police telephone call and was requested to
come down to the homicide office. Defendant complied, and subsequently
74. 25 N.Y.2d 585, 256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851
(1970).
75. Id. at 587, 256 N.E.2d at 172-73, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
76. Id. at 590-91, 256 N.E.2d at 175, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
77. "A man, shoeless and all but naked, separated from his wife .. . alone, except for
interrogating policemen, and after having been subjected to many hours of interrogation about a
murder, is not free to move, is certainly in custody, and is not in a condition to make an
intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver .... Id. at 598, 256 N.E.2d at 179, 307 N.Y.S.2d
at 867 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 591, 256 N.E.2d at 175, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 862. The dissent argued that "the
police version of the interrogation was so unreliable as not be credited . . . ." Id. at 594, 256
N.E.2d at 177, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 864 (Breitel, J., dissenting). See People v. Neulist, 72 Misc.2d
140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Nassau County Ct. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 43 App. Div. 2d 150,
350 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't 1973) (defendant ordered to police station, questioned and subjected
to battery of scientific tests over ten hour period including paraffin test and neutron activation
analysis. Held: defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation since his statements were
voluntary); People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967) (defendant
questioned in his backyard and then arrested. Held: no custodial interrogation. Dissent argued
majority erroneously focused on question of whether defendant's statements were compelled. Id.
at 13, 233 N.E.2d at 262, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36 (Burke, J., dissenting)).
79. 384 U.S. at 457.
80. E.g., United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 1968); State v. Vining, 2
Vash. App. 802, 806, 472 P.2d 564, 567 (1970).
81. See note 20 supra.
82. 32 Md. App. 529, 363 A.2d 243 (1976).
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made an exculpatory statement which aroused police suspicions.8 3 After he
repeated the statement at police request defendant was given Miranda
warnings and then jailed. The Maryland Special Court of Appeals found the
statement was not made during custodial interrogation, stressing an officer's
testimony that defendant was not considered a suspect until he made the
statement and was free to leave up until the moment he was advised of his
rights.8 4 The courts have not always been so willing to give credence to an
officer's testimony. In State v. Godfrey,8s defendant voluntarily appeared at
the police station after being told that the police wished to interview him.
Defendant submitted to a polygraph test at the request of a detective and was
then informed that the results showed he was lying.86 At this point, defendant
confessed and was given his Miranda warnings.8 7 The New Jersey court
found the confession inadmissible as the product of custodial interrogation
and rejected as "incredible and not worthy of belief"88 police testimony that
defendant was free to leave at any time until he confessed.
A case that resembles Mathiason in several respects is United States v.
Manglona.89 Defendant voluntarily appeared at the office of a Naval inves-
tigator in response to a telephone request. The investigator gave Manglona
defective Miranda warnings, 90 informed him that he was not under arrest and
that he was free to leave at any time. The investigator then took a written
statement and Manglona immediately left the office. The Ninth Circuit found
that these facts did not constitute custodial interrogation.9"
83. Miranda applies to exculpatory as well as inculpatory statements. See 384 U.S. at 444.
84. 32 Md. App. at -, 363 A.2d at 245-46.
85. 131 N.J. Super. 168, 329 A.2d 75 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 267, 337 A.2d 371
(1975) (per curiam).
86. Id. at 173, 329 A.2d at 77. There was also psychiatric testimony which indicated that
defendant was mentally retarded. Id.
87. It is not dear what occurred next but it appears that defendant was arrested after a
written confession was obtained. Id.
88. Id. at 177, 329 A.2d at 80.
89. 414 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Scully, 415 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.
1969). In Scully, the police telephoned defendant and requested an interview, offering to come to
his home or to conduct the interview at the station. Defendant chose the stationhouse and upon
arriving was given incomplete Miranda warnings. Id. at 681-83. It should be noted that the
gratuitous giving of warnings does not convert an otherwise noncustodial situation into a
custodial one. Cummings v. State, 27 Md. App. 361, 375-76, 341 A.2d 294, 304 (1975). Scully
was also told that he was not required to submit to questioning and that he could leave at any
time. During the following three hours defendant made several incriminating statements. He then
refused to say anything more and left the station. No further action was taken against Scully for
almost three years, after he had moved to another state. The Second Circuit reasoned that since
defendant was not given any indication that he was under an obligation to answer questions and
since he terminated the interview of his own accord, he was not deprived of his freedom in any
way and, in fact, did not believe that he was so deprived. 415 F.2d at 684.
90. He was not advised of his right to appointed counsel. 414 F.2d at 644.
91. Id. See also People v. Wasson, 31 Mich. App. 638, 188 N.W.2d 55 (1971) where
defendant also voluntarily complied with a police request that he come to the station for
questioning. At the end of the interview, defendant was freely permitted to leave the
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The major factor which distinguishes Manglona from Mathiason is that the
latter case involved a parolee. 92 It would seem that a person on parole
questioned behind closed doors in a police station concerning a crime in which
he is already the prime suspect could reasonably believe that he is not free to
refuse to answer. 93 Analogously, in Mathis v. United States,94 the Supreme
Court found that a prisoner interviewed in his own jail cell concerning his
involvement in an unrelated offense was subjected to custodial interrogation.
Since a parolee is in legal custody for the duration of his term, 95 it is arguable
that the principle of Mathis should have been determinative in Mathiason.
United States v. Harrison96 also dealt with a defendant parolee. The police
came to his door and suggested he accompany them to the stationhouse. After
approximately five hours of questioning, defendant was taken to his candy
store which was searched. He was then taken back to the police station and
arrested. At no time was Harrison advised of his rights. The district court
found that defendant had been subjected to custodial interrogation during the
initial stationhouse interview. 97 One commentator has suggested that the
court found Harrison's questioning custodial "because of his peculiar situation
as a parolee."98 Because of this fact, Harrison may reasonably have felt
compelled to cooperate with the police. 99 Harrison, however, is a stronger
case than Mathiason since the police accompanied Harrison to the station and
also arrested him after the questioning was over. In Manglona, on the other
hand, where no custody was found, defendant was allowed to leave freely at
station house. Defendant was held not to have been subjected to custodial interrogation, but the
court applied the now discredited focus test. See id. at 642, 188 N.W.2d at 57.
92. Other distinguishing factors are that in Mathiason, the police, in an effort to obtain
defendant's confession, falsely told him that his fingerprints had been found at the scene and
further stated that his truthfulness would be taken into account by the prosecuting attorney or
judge. 97 S. Ct. at 713. But see note 64 supra.
93. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1977, § 4, at 2, col. 3, arguing that "most people, when
requested to appear at a police station will regard the request as an order and a police order a
restraint."
94. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
95. See note 71 supra.
96. 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
97. Id. at 662. See also People v. White, 69 Cal. 2d 751, 446 P.2d 993, 72 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1968) (en banc) (finding custody); People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr.
115 (1967) (en banc) (same). For an interesting case finding questioning noncustodial in a military
context where defendant was invited to the investigator's office, see United States v. Knight, 261
F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
98. Smith, supra note 16, at 711.
99. Cf. Freije v. United States, 408 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969). In
Freije, defendant went to the police station in response to a request for an interview. At some
point he refused to answer any further questions. Id. at 102. The First Circuit distinguished
Harrison and found that defendant was not in custody apparently relying on the fact that
defendant was not compelled to come to the station and that he had a choice as to the situs of the
interview. Id. at 102-03. The case is criticized in Smith, supra note 16, at 730 & n.150. But in
Mathiason as well as in Harrison it would seem that a major additional source of compulsion
arose from the defendants' status as parolees.
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the end of the interview. Thus, it has been suggested that where a suspect is
not arrested and is allowed to leave following the questioning, the interroga-
tion will never be deemed custodial. 100 This misses the point. If the question-
ing is custodial in the sense of having deprived the accused of his freedom of
action in some way, it should not thereby become noncustodial merely
because he is allowed to leave at some later time. However, after Mathiason,
it would appear that suspects who voluntarily go to a police station for
questioning and who are not arrested before being allowed to depart will not
be found in custody for purposes of Miranda regardless of any other circum-
stances which might indicate coercion.
In conclusion, Mathiason makes four important points about the
future of Miranda. First, the Court has limited the definition of custodial
interrogation to mean questioning that takes place while an accused is " 'in
custody.' "101 Second, "custody" will be narrowly construed. Thus, a suspect
will be unlikely to be found in custody "in the absence of . . . formal
arrest."10 2 Third, Miranda will not be extended to circumstances analogous
to, but different from, custodial interrogation even though such circumstances
may contain pressures which are equally compelling or coercive.""0 Fourth,
where Miranda is not deemed to apply, the old voluntariness standard will
determine admissibility. The trend appears to be toward revival of this
standard. °4 Miranda, then, is not overruled but only limited. However, these
limitations have cut Miranda loose from the rationale which created it and
may lead to arbitrary and mechanical application of its principles. The more
mechanically it is applied, the easier it will be to overrule.10 s
Theodore N. Far-is
100. Cummings v. State, 27 Md. App. 361, 378-79, 341 A.2d 294, 305 (1975) (citing cases).
101. "Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' It was that sort of coercive environment to which
Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited." 97 S. CL at 714.
102. Id.
103. This is the significance of the Courts rejection of the "coercive environment" test devised
by the Oregon Supreme Court. See notes 62-67 supra and accompanying text. Thus, Mr. Justice
Marshall stated that: "More fundamentally... I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that if
respondent were not in custody no Efiranda] warnings were required ...
. . . Rather, faithfulness to Miranda requires us to distinguish situations that resemble the
'coercive aspects' of custodial interrogation from those that more nearly resemble 'glWeneral
on-the-scene questioning . . . or other general questioning . ... '
In my view, even if respondent were not in custody, the coercive elements in the instant case
were so pervasive as to require Miranda-type warnings." 97 S. CL at 715 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
104. See Friedman, Hashmall & Hirsch, Criminal Procedure, 1976 Ann. Survey Am. L. 133,
165-80.
105. Some commentators appear to have been somewhat incautious in predicting Miranda's
demise. See, e.g., Note, Michigan v. Mosley- A New Constitutional Procedure, S4 N.C.L. Rev.
695, 704-05 (1976); 10 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1141, 1178 (1976); 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 279, 296-97
(1976). The Court does not seem eager to reexamine Miranda. See Brewer v. Williams, 45
U.S.L.W. 4287, 4289-90 (U.S. March 23, 1977) (decided on sixth amendment right to counsel
grounds although both lower federal courts had found Miranda violations).
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Constitutional Law-Sixth Circuit Holds Removal of Books from Li-
brary Violates High School Students' Right to Know.-School board
decisions involving controversial contemporary novels are often met with
charges of witch-hunting, book-burning and censorship. Indeed threats of
violence, sniper fire and fire-bombing have ensued. 1 While not reaching such
extreme proportions, heated debate arose in Strongsville, Ohio, when the
Board of Education rejected the recommendation of its English department
faculty that Joseph Heller's Catch 22 be purchased for use as a high school
text for the 1972-73 academic year. 2 Alternative texts--God Bless You, Mr.
Rosewater and Cat's Cradle, both by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.-were then similarly
recommended and rejected at special board meetings held during the sum-
mer. 3 Having thus quashed the use of these novels as texts in the English
department curriculum, the Board voted to remove existing copies from the
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1973, at 40, col. 3 (copies of Slaughterhouse-Five by Kurt Vonnegut,
Jr., removed and burned in Drake, N.D.; school board's indication that teacher who assigned
book would not be rehired labeled witch-hunt); N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1971, at 47, col. 2 (removal
of Piri Thomas' autobiography, Down These Mean Streets, from N.Y.C. school libraries said to
smack of book-burning); N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1972, at 38, col. I (decision in Ridgefield, Ct., to
remove Boss, Mayor Richard Daley's biography by M. Royko, from twelfth grade reading list
called political censorship); N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1973, at 39, col. 5 (threats of violence made to
president of Ridgefield, Ct., school board after vote to remove Soul on Ice by Eldridge Cleaver
and Police, Courts and the Ghetto by Marjorie Kilbane and Patricia Claire from the high school
curriculum); Franklin, Textbook Dispute Has Many Causes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1974, at 31,
col. 1 (sniperfire, dynamiting and firebombing result from decision of Kanawha County school
board in West Virginia to keep certain controversial texts in school system).
Recently, a class action was filed in New York Supreme Court, Nassau County, to overturn
the Island Trees Board of Education's decision to remove certain books from the senior and
junior high school libraries and curriculum. See Complaint in Pico v. Board of Educ., Island
Trees, Union Free School Dist. 26, Index No. 22724 (Sup. Ct., N.Y., filed Dec. 20, 1976). See
also Thomas, The Right to Write and to Read, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1976, at 39, col. 2.
2. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698, 702-03 (N.D. Ohio 1974),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). Procedure established by the Board in
1970 provided that textbook suggestions be initiated by the faculty, commented upon by a
Citizens Textbook Committee, presented to the Eductiona Program and Policy Committee (a
Board subcommittee) to be evaluated and presented to the entire four-member Board for final
consideration. 384 F. Supp. at 700-01.
3. Id. at 703. Instead of these alternative texts, the Board at its September meeting selected
Travels with Charlie by John Steinbeck, which was the faculty's fourth choice. This action, taken
at a "special" rather than a "regular" meeting, was challenged by the students as violating the
state statute which required that textbook selection be made at regular meetings of the Board
"held between the first Monday in February and the first Monday in August ... Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 3329.08 (Page 1972).
Although it is unclear whether Cat's Cradle was ever reviewed by the Citizens Advisory
Committee, this committee registered negative comments on textbook use of Catch 22 and God
Bless You, Mr. Rosewater. Id. at 702.
The literary value of all three books was "conceded by the parties .... Similarly, obscenity as
defined in the Supreme Court's pronouncements set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), as subsequently interpreted by Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) [was] eliminated as
an issue . . . by agreement of counsel." 384 F. Supp. at 703-04 (parallel cites omitted).
1977) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1237
school libraries. 4 The controversy culminated in the filing of a class action s by
five high school students 6 against the Board, its individually elected members
4. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1976).
S. The district court qualified plaintiffs' claim as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 384 F. Supp. at 708. This rule provides that the following prerequisites
be met: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
The anomalous situation then arose that other high school students who were deemed
sufficiently adverse to be allowed to intervene as defendants were insufficiently adverse to be able
to successfully challenge plaintiffs' class action status. The student-defendants claimed that they
and a majority of the students in the district were not "similarly situated" so as to warrant
representation by plaintiffs. 384 F. Supp. at 707-08.
This position appears to be well taken in light of prerequisites (3) and (4) above. Prof. Wright
describes the somewhat analogous taxpayer class action to block a proposed public expenditure in
which some members of the class of taxpayers might actually desire that the expenditure be
made. He notes that "[iln any conceivable case, some of the members of the class will wish to
assert their rights while others will not wish to do so. . . .Yet no one has ever doubted the
propriety of bringing such a suit as a class action." C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, 347-48 (3d
ed. 1976) (footnotes omitted). In this case, however, the student-defendants actively defended the
position that no such right exists. Allowing student-defendants to intervene to protect rights
which are by virtue of the class action "fairly and adequately" represented by student-plaintiffs
appears contradictory. However, the class determination was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. 541
F.2d at 579. Although the Second Circuit has rejected the use of the class action device in a
similar situation, Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 372 F.2d 155, 161-63 (2d Cir. 1967),
vacated on other grounds, 391 U.S. 99 (1968), it has been argued that any group is bound to have
conflicts within it and to require complete "unity of interest" would all but eliminate effective use
of the class action. See Comment, The Federal Courts Take a New Look at Class Actions, 27
Baylor L. Rev. 751, 759 (1975).
6. Defendants also contended that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The court rejected this
argument in response to pre-trial motions. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2-3, Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Brief).
The students alleged standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), see note 7 infra, in that state
officials had acted arbitrarily in implementing state textbook statutes in violation of their
constitutional rights. Although a student's right to academic freedom is not one previously
recognized as a constitutional right, standing has been predicated on this claim. See Presidents
Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert- denied, 409
U.S. 998 (1972). Additionally, students have been granted standing to challenge school board
actions on due process, free speech and equal protection grounds. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975) (standing to challenge student suspensions ordered by school board without prior hearing);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (standing to
challenge restrictions on wearing black armbands); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C.
1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (standing to challenge
statute governing appointments to school board). The views of commentators on the issue of
standing are not uniform. See Davis, Judicial Control of Administrative Action: A Review, 66
Colum. L. Rev. 635, 659-66 (1966); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review. Public Actions, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1310 (1961).
Standing may also have been predicated on an administrative law concept, namely, the
students' claim that the Board failed to implement its legislative mandate. In administrative law,
"the delegation of legislative power to subordinate political divisions of the state is solely for
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and the superintendent of schools. 7
Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief in federal district court
claiming that the arbitrary Board actions operated as a prior restraint on their
first amendment rights to freedom of speech. Moreover, the students alleged
that their academic freedom to learn and their fourteenth amendment rights
to due process and equal protection had been violated.8
The district court found that "responsibility for the selection and determina-
tion of materials for use in the high school curriculum and public school
libraries" was vested by the legislature in the Board.9 The court concluded
that the Board's actions neither inhibited classroom discussion nor infringed
on any constitutional right. 10 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that
teachers had not been prevented from discussing the books in class' I and that
the Board had properly exercised its authority in the area of textboolk
selection, 12 but reversed the lower court's finding that the Board had any
similar authority to control library content. 13 The court noted that although
the Board's action in removing the books Catch 22 and Cat's Cradle from the
library was in itself neutral in first amendment terms, an inference could be
drawn from examining the record that the Board was motivated by a desire
"to censor" library content. 14 Basing its decision squarely on a student's first
amendment right to know, the court ordered that the books be replaced in the
school libraries. 15 Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, 541 F.2d
577 (6th Cir. 1976).
Questions which have arisen concerning curriculum ,or library book selec-
public purposes, and must be exercised with reference to them. . . . Discretion vested In the
municipal authorities must be exercised reasonably, and in such a way as to further the purpose
of the power so granted; and if the municipal authorities act otherwise, the court will exercise the
right, as they have always done, to set aside or enjoin their acts." 2 E. McQuillin, The Law of
Municipal Corporations § 10.37, at 835-36 (rev. ed. 1966) (footnotes omitted). This was the
position taken by defendants in their brief to the court of appeals: "lit is clear that the within
litigation involves itself with the sole issue of the discretion to be exercised by a public authority
in the performance of its duties." Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 5, Minarcini v. Strongsville
City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Brief).
7. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section is based on the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, and provides that civil suit may be brought against a
state governmental official where that official: "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. .. ." For a general discussion of the effect
of this section on school boards, see Comment, Suing the School Board under Section 1983, 21
S.D.L. Rev. 452 (1976); Note, Student's Rights Versus Administrator's Immunity: Goss v. Lopez,
Wood v. Strickland, 50 St. John's L. Rev. 102 (1975).
8. 384 F. Supp. at 700.
9. Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
10. Id. See also notes 46-51 infra and accompanying text.
11. 541 F.2d at 584.
12. Id. at 579-80.
13. Id. at 580-83.
14. Id. at 582. See text accompanying notes 63-67 infra.
15. 541 F.2d at 584.
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tions are generally phrased in first amendment religious freedom terms. In
Epperson v. Arkansas 6 on both establishment of religion and free exercise
grounds, the Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas statute which forbade
the use in public schools of any text17 containing Darwin's theory of evolu-
tion. The Court reasoned that
[t]he State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not
carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a
scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate
the First Amendment. 18
In an early New York decision, Rosenberg v. Board of Education,"9
plaintiffs sought the removal of the Dickens novel Oliver Twist and Shakes-
peare's The Merchant of Venice on grounds that these works presented a
derogatory picture of Jews. Finding for the board, the court held that
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the books had been written with the
malicious intent of promoting racial or religious hatred in violation of first
amendment rights to free exercise of religion.2 0 Similarly, in Todd v. Roches-
ter Community Schools,2' a Michigan court rejected an attempt by parents to
remove Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s, Slaughterhouse-Five from the high school
curriculum and library on grounds that the novel was anti-religious. The
court noted that "[]t is for the lawfully elected school board, its supervisory
personnel and its teachers to determine the local schools' curriculum."22
The court held that the mere fact that a book is religious or anti-religious is
not determinative. Rather, a plaintiff must show that an active preference for
one religion over another guided the board in its selection process or affected
the manner in which the faculty presented the book.23 More recently, in
Williams v. Board of Education,24 a West Virginia district court held that the
board's selection procedure violated neither the right to religious freedom nor
the right to privacy. The court observed that while some of the books selected
contained potentially offensive language, free exercise rights do not require
that public schools be silent on the topic of religion.2 5 Although all three cases
16. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
17. The statute would thus encompass the shelving of the text in the school library as well.
18. 393 U.S. at 107.
19. 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. CL 1949).
20. Id. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
21. 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972).
22. Id. at 340, 200 N.W.2d at 99. Courts have recognized, however, that there are certain
constraints placed on a teacher's selection of reading material for students at the elementary or
high school level. Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 965 (1975); Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (Ist Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Keefe v.
Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
For a discussion of the standards for review, see Comment, The Dwindling Rights of Teachers
and the Closing Courthouse Door, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 511, 521-24 (1975).
23. 41 Mich. App. at 328-32, 200 N.W.2d at 93-95.
24. 388 F. Supp. 93 (S. D.W. Va.), affd, 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975).
25. Id. at 94-97.
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can be distinguished from Minarcini in that they involved attempts to remove
a book selected by a school board, they are nonetheless significant in that each
decision focused not on the nature of the challenge-removal or reshelving-
but rather on board authority and how it was exercised. Both the Todd and
Williams decisions reiterated the theme of Epperson-constitutional violations
do not arise if book selection is exercised in a religiously neutral manner.26
The only decision to deal exclusively with school board authority to control
library content was handed down by the Second Circuit in Presidents
Council, District 25 v. Community School Board No. 25.27 The board
removed Piri Thomas' autobiographical account of life in Spanish Harlem,
Down These Mean Streets, because of parents' complaints that the sex,
violence and drug-use described in the novel rendered it unsuitable reading
for the junior high school student. A second group-representatives of various
parent-teacher associations, students, parents and faculty-filed suit in New
York district court to overturn the board action.2 8 Affirming the lower court's
dismissal of the complaint, the court of appeals held that the removal did not
infringe upon any constitutional right.2 9 Plaintiffs' religious freedom argument
was dismissed as "patently" inapplicable. 30 The academic freedom argu-
ments raised were found unconvincing as teachers could still discuss
and assign the novel and parents could obtain it on a direct-loan basis for
their children.3 ' Similarly, the court disagreed with plaintiffs' argument that
26. 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968).
27. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
28. Id. at 290. The board later allowed those libraries which had previously held the book to
continue to do so but on a restricted "direct-loan basis" to parents. It has been suggested that this
type of qualification, which might have precluded suit if introduced earlier, is one factor which
helps to explain why litigation in this area is so sparse. O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First
Amendment, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 209, 213 (1973).
29. 457 F.2d at 291-92.
30. Id. at 292.
3 1. Id. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that teachers possess a degree of freedom
from control over their classroom experience [Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (first amendment "does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom")],
the concept of academic freedom has only been applied at the university level. Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
It would appear that the success of an academic freedom claim depends on the age of the
student. "The state interest in limiting the discretion of teachers grows stronger... as the age of
the students decreases; thus, the Fourteenth and First Amendments do not necessarily give
teachers of younger students the same 'academic freedom' that they give to teachers of college
students." Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 799 (N.D. Iowa
1972).
"Mt is clear that the premises which underlie academic freedom in-higher education have not
historically been compatible with the American concept of lower education. ...
"The central fact in the distinction between higher and lower education is the role of value
inculcation in the teaching process. The public schools in the United States traditionally have
viewed instilling the young with societal values as a significant part of the schools' educational
mission. Such a mission is directly opposed to the vision of education that underlies the premises
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in the absence of an obscenity ruling, students have an "unqualified first
amendment right of access to books" once the books are selected and
shelved. 32 The court reasoned that "[tihis concept of a book acquiring tenure
by shelving is indeed novel and unsupportable under any theory of constitu-
tional law we can discover. '3 3 Essentially, the court viewed the operation of a
school library as a "constant process of selection and winnowing" which can
be motivated by various reasons, including space, economy and changing
educational requirements. 34
It would seem dear to us that books which become obsolete or irrelevant or where
improperly selected initially, for whatever reason, can be removed by the same
authority which was empowered to make the selection in the first place.3
The right to know on which the Sixth Circuit based its decision in
Minarcini had never previously been recognized in the high school'context.
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that adults may possess a right
to hear, and a right to receive information and ideas, it has emphasized that
these rights are not without limitation.36 In Procunier v. Martinez, 37 the
Court invalidated a prisoner mail censorship program because it infringed on
the free speech rights of the non-prisoner recipients. However the court noted
that this right could be limited by the state's interests in prison security or
rehabilitation.38 Similarly in Kleindienst v. Mandel,39 the Court held that
university professors had no unconditional right "to hear, speak and debate"
with a Marxist scholar who had been denied a temporary visa to visit the
United States. 40 Otherwise, the Court observed, for each alien excluded, some
of academic freedom in higher education [i.e., the search for truth through inquiry and
research.]" Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine
What They Teach, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1342-43 (1976) (footnote omitted).
"The classroom of the public school is certainly not so fundamentally a locus for the
marketplace of ideas, or the free exchange of opinion, as is the public park, the public street, the
public auditorium, or even the college classroom." Schauer, School Books, Lesson Plans, and the
Constitution, 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 287, 301 (1976).
In view of the age of the group of children involved in the Presidents Council case, i.e., 11 to
15 years olds, a low level of freedom may well exist.
32. 457 F.2d at 292-93. The court declared that plaintiffs' reliance on the variable obscenity
standard established by Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) in support of this point was
"puzzling." Id. at 292.
33. 457 F.2d at 293.
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (upholding regulation
requiring reply time where individual is made subject to personal attack or political candidate is
subject of an editorial): All precedents in this area were cited by the Minarcini court. 541 F.zd at
583.
37. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
38. Id. at 412-13.
39. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
40. Id. at 762-70.
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individual could be heard to complain that his right to hear had been
infringed. 4 1
The most recent pronouncement on the right to receive information deals
with commercial speech. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,4 2 a consumer group argued that a state
statute forbidding pharmacists to advertise the prices of prescription drugs
infringed on their right to know. The Court upheld both the right of
consumers to challenge the law and their claim that commercial speech
warranted first amendment protection: "the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both." 43 Again, however,
the Court cautioned that "we of course do not hold that [commercial speech)
can never be regulated in any way."'44
In accord with precedent, the lower court in Minarcini did not include the
right to know among those rights guaranteed to students by the Constitu-
tion. 45 All constitutional arguments that were raised against the Board's
refusal to use Catch 22, God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater or Cat's Cradle were
rejected. Neither the establishment nor the free exercise clauses had been
violated since the Board had taken no action which limited the teaching of
any theory or doctrine. 46 Similarly, free speech values were not involved since
the books could still be discussed in the classroom and assigned as supple-
mental reading. 47 Thus, finding first amendment claims inapplicable, the
district court confined its review to the issues of whether the Board was
authorized to veto the books48 and, if so, whether that authority was
41. Id. at 768.
42. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
43. Id. at 756.
44. Id. at 770. The Court outlined several situations where a significant governmental interest
would circumscribe the right to know. Id. at 771-73.
45. Originally, basic constitutional rights of the public school child focused on the first
amendment. The earliest Supreme Court decision to strike down state action on first amendment
grounds was West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag
salute and recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance violated first amendment rights of Jehovah's
Witnesses). Similar challenges followed: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (compulsory school
prayer violated establishment clause); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(bible reading as part of opening school exercise held contrary to the establishment clause);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish children excused from compulsory education on
free exercise grounds).
Subsequently, the Court acknowledged students' constitutional rights to equal protection,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); to free speech, Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); and to due process, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975). See also, Note, Constitutional Law-The Children's Crusade for Constitutional Recogni-
tion, 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 193 (1976).
46. 384 F. Supp. at 706-07.
47. Id. at 706.
48. The district court cited only the state statute relating to textbook authorization: "The
board of education of each city, exempted village, and local school district shall cause It to be
ascertained and at a regular meeting determine which, and the number of each of the textbooks
the schools under its charge require." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3329.07 (Page 1972). But
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exercised in a reasonable and nonarbitrary way.49 The court found that the
Board's authority extended over both "high school curriculum and public
school libraries"s ° and concluded that "[t]he action of the Board as reflected
by the evidence in its entirety was not arbitrary and capricious.""s
The Sixth Circuit upheld the finding that the legislature had placed
textbook selection authority in the Board, adopting reasoning similar to that
of the Second Circuit in Presidents Council:s 2
Clearly, discretion as to the selection of textbooks must be lodged somewhere and
we can find no federal constitutional prohibition which prevents its being lodged in
school board officials who are elected representatives of the people.53
authorization with regard to library books is contained in section 3329.05 which provides that
with regard to the "purchase of supplementary reading books, library books, reference books, or
any other books except textbooks . . . .All of such books .. . shall be ordered, received,
examined, and paid for in the same manner... as other supplies and equipment." Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 3329.05 (Page 1972). The district court evidently found it unnecessary to specify
statutory grounds for the Board's authority over the selection of library books within the category
"other supplies and equipment!' because it did not address that issue. However, two sections of
the Ohio Revised Code that went uncited support the court's finding that the state legislature had
fixed responsibility in the Board over both curriculum and library matters.
The first deals with authority over programs and supplies: "The board of education of each
county school district may provide programs, examinations, school records, diplomas, and other
necessary supplies and equipment for the use of the county superintendent in furthering the
instructional program of the county school district." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3315.06 (Page 1972)
(emphasis added).
The second deals with overall management and control of district schools: "Each city,
exempted village, or local board of education shall have the management and control of all of the
public schools of whatever name or character in its respective district." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
3313.47 (Page 1972) (emphasis added).
49. The scope of judicial review has been defined as follows: "[School boards] are usually
given extensive discretionary powers .... The courts will not interfere with the exercise of this
discretion except to prevent an abuse of it. Thus the rule usually prevails that the action of a
board of education taken in the reasonable exercise of its discretion in honesty and good faith and
without fraud or sinister motive is not subject to juddicial review." 16 E. McQuillin, The Law of
Municipal Corporations § 46.07, at 665 (rev. ed. 1972). See also, Board of Educ. v. State ex rel.
Goldman, 47 Oh. App. 417, 191 N.E. 914 (1934) (school board decisions are free from judicial
review absent abuse of discretion); Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions
of Schooling in America, Education and the Legal Structure, 6 Harv. Educ. Rev. 35 (1971).
50. 384 F. Supp. at 705.
51. Id. at 708 (emphasis added). Although the court stated that "the only issue of concern for
the Court's determination is the Board's authority to ultimately select... textbooks," id. at 704,
use of the words "in its entirety" would seem to encompass library books and textbooks within the
framework of the court's conclusions. The court only alludes to the books being removed from the
library in a theoretical discussion of the necessity of "editorial judgment" as an element in the
decision-making processes involving schools, libraries and the news media. Id.
52. Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (1972).
"Since we are dealing not with the collection of a public book store but with the library of a
public junior high school, evidently some authorized person or body has to make a determination
as to what the library collection will be." Id. at 291-92.
53. 541 F.2d at 579. The court divided the issues into three distinct categories: textbooks,
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Moreover, the court held that procedures established to implement that
authority presented no constitutional problems. 54
On the question of academic freedom, the court affirmed the district court's
finding that classroom speech was not inhibited by the Board's action. 55
Noting that the resolutions adopted by the Board might have a "somewhat
chilling effect upon classroom discussion," the court suggested that this slight
chill would be cured by its order invalidating removal of the books from the
library.56
It is on the library book issue that the Sixth Circuit broke new ground by
deciding that their removal constituted a violation of the students' right to
know. Although the right to know forms the basis of the decision, the court
provides no explanation as to its constitutional origins.
[W]e assume that no one would dispute that the First Amendment's protection of
academic freedom would protect both [the teacher's classroom opinion as to a particu-
lar novel] and his students' right to hear him and to find and read the book. S7
The court assumes that students possess a right to academic freedom but such
a right has never before been recognized at the secondary school level.58
The right to know is equally without precedent in the area of education.5 9
Although the Minarcini court suggests that absent the Supreme Court's
decision three months earlier in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the
existence of a right to know would be doubtful, it is silent as to how a decision
in the area of consumer relations and adult commercial speech is pertinent to
the student in the secondary school system where rights are admittedly more
limited. 60 While acknowledging the existence of this right, the court fails to
delineate the scope of this right or define the appropriate standard of judicial
review. It seems clear that the right to know is not a fundamental right. 61 In
library books and academic freedom. 541 F.2d at 579, 580, 583. This tripartite discussion
followed the order of argument set out in the plaintiffs' appeal brief. Plaintiffs' Brief at 14, 36, 60.
Interestingly, defendants followed the district court approach and made no reference to the
library book issue at all.
54. 541 F.2d at 580.
55. Id. at 584. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals found it necessary to address
the substantive nature of the right to academic freedom since both found that teachers were not
prohibited from discussing the books. Whether an outright prohibition by the Board would be
improper has been subject to question. "Neither sound constitutional analysis nor authoritative
precedent support a federal constitutional right of teachers to determine what they teach contrary
to the desires of school authorities .. " Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public
School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1355 (1976).
56. 541 F.2d at 584.
57. Id. at 582 (emphasis added).
58. See notes 31 & 55, supra. In fact the Supreme Court has recently denied that the right to
education is a fundamental right. San Antionio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See Note, The Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 796, 804-05
(1975).
59. See notes 35-44 supra and accompanying text.
60. 541 F.2d at 583.
61. Where a fundamental right is involved, the due process and equal protection clauses of
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fact, it appears -from the court's decision that a rational basis standard was
applied.62 The court seems to indicate that because the Board's acts were
motivated by a desire "to censor" no rational basis for its actions could be
found. 63 It is interesting to note that the Board's actions with respect to
textbooks were neither arbitrary nor capricious but that those same acts were
found unconstitutional as they related to library books. Thus, on the same set
of facts, one action is both rationally based and constitutionally impermissi-
ble. 4 The court offered no express justification for a distinction but stressed
that while the Board was not obliged to create a school library, "[o]nce having
created such a privilege for the benefit of its students. .. neither [the state nor
the Board] could place conditions on the use of the library which were related
solely to the social or political tastes of school board members. ' 6s The court's
determination that Board action was based solely on the social and political
tastes of its members is, however, open to question. The court explained that a
minority report filed by one member of the Board, Dr. Cain, provided the
"sole explanation" for the Board's action and permitted the inference to be
drawn that the books were censored. 66 In fact, the minority report limited its
derogatory comments to the two books written by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., and
therefore does not dearly provide an inference as to why Joseph Heller's
Catch 22 was removed from the library a month and a half later. 67 Further,
the court ignored the fact that a minority report of a four-member board is the
the fourteenth amendment require that this right may not be infringed by the state absent a
compelling state interest. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17,
29, 40, 51 (1973); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
62. 541 F.2d at 582. One commentator recently noted that the scope of judicial review in
school decisions "should properly be a narrow one, limited to an inquiry into the existence of a
rational education basis." Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The
Scope of Judicial Review, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1479, 1511 (1972).
63. 541 F.2d at 582.
64. In fact, the Board did not consider the use of the novels as textbooks and as library books
separately but rather assessed the book itself and then simultaneously voted to reject it as a text
and remove it from the library. The one exception was Catch 22, which the Board voted to reject
as a text on June 8, 1972 (Plaintiffs' Brief at 8), and voted to remove from the library on Aug. 31,
1972. 541 F.2d at 580.
65. 541 F.2d at 582 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 581. The report labeled God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater as" 'completely sick' "and
"'GARBAGE' " and recommended that Cat's Cradle, "which was written by the same character
(Vennegutter)" be removed from the school library. Id. at 581-82.
The author of the minority report, Dr. Cain, testified at trial, however, that he was guided by
Board rules that described the educational goal of the school system as "'to train or discipline
each school student mentally or physically, consistent with the knowledge and truths of and pride
in our national, historic and traditional ethics under God, thereby to cultivate, inspire and
develop the character and abilities of each student to his or her maximum potential.' " Plaintiffs'
Brief at 9.
67. 541 F.2d at 581-82. Whether the circuit court was procedurally correct in drawing this
inference is open to debate. While federal courts are in accord that findings of fact based on oral
testimony are reversible if dearly erroneous, decisions are split as to whether the same standard
applies where the trial court's findings are based on both oral testimony and documentary
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report of one member and that subsequent votes for removal were carried by
a three to one majority. Thus, an inference that a report by one member
critical of one author implicates the entire Board in unconstitutional behavior
is tenuous.
Clearly, this decision abruptly departs from precedents in this area. The
judicial restraint evident in earlier decisions is undermined by the creation of
a student's right to know. That more limitations exist on a student's right to
know than would attach to the same right in an adult is obvious from a
comparison with the companion right of academic freedom to teach where it
is clear that more limitations exist in the secondary school context than at the
university level. In applying the right to know to students, the court also fails
to take cognizance of the fact that the Supreme Court in recent decisions
amplifying this right with respect to adults has been careful to emphasize that
this is not an unlimited right.
The "administrative law" approach adopted by the district court and the
Second Circuit seems preferable. Judicial review should be limited to an
examination of the nature, extent and exercise of authority delegated to school
boards and to a determination of whether the discretion so delegated had a
good faith educational basis. Courts would thus be spared the difficult task of
investigating the motive behind every board action. This approach would
further the goal of judicial non-interference absent a clear abuse of discretion
in the decision-making process of public school agencies. While few people
condone censorship, unpopular decisions of school boards, as the district court
pointed out, are better left to legislative rather than to judicial change. 68 In
fact, experience reveals that dissatisfaction with school board decisions are
more effectively handled at the polls. 6 9
Barbara Mailly Norman
evidence. In the latter case, the view has been advanced that because the appeal court is equally
able to access documentary evidence, it may properly substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court. C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, 479-80 (3d ed. 1976). Prof. Wright's analysis of this
question concludes that the correct construction of the clearly-erroneous doctrine-Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-is that it applies to findings based on both oral and
documentary evidence. Appellate courts "must be especially reluctant [to set aside as clearly
erroneous] the finding below where it rested, in part, on the opportunity of the trial judge to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses." Id. at 480. The Minarcini decision is silent as to whether
reversal is based on the clearly erroneous standard or on de novo review.
68. 384 F. Supp. at 705.
69. The district court noted that two years after the dispute in the Strongsville City School
District, two new members were elected to serve on the Board and the newly constituted Board
approved the use of a similarly controversial novel-Manchild in the Promised Land by Clarence
Brown-as a text. 384 F. Supp. at 705. Similarly, four years after the dispute in the Presidents
Council case, an entirely new Board voted to restore Piri Thomas' novel Down These Mean
Streets, to general circulation indicating that they viewed "book banning as 'abhorrent' and
'undemocratic.' " N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1975, at 21, col. 5.
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Immigration-State Certificate of Relief from Disabilities Prevents
Mandatory Deportation Under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11).-Petitioner,
Shaheen Rehman, a citizen of Pakistan, had entered the United States as a
non-immigrant graduate student at Syracuse University. While in this country
he was found to have a small amount of hashish in his possession, for which
he pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in New
York City Criminal Court.' Rehman, then twenty-two years old, received a
one year conditional discharge2 for this conviction and was also issued a
temporary "certificate of relief from disabilities '3 (certificate). The certificate
prevented Rehman from suffering the automatic penalties and loss of rights
which normally would have accompanied a criminal conviction. This tempo-
rary certificate became permanent after one year.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) brought deportation
proceedings against Rehman and, based upon his New York conviction,
found him subject to mandatory deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
125 1(a)(1 1).4 The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Rehman's appeal
and entered an order of deportation against him, whereupon he petitioned the
Second Circuit for review. Despite the clear mandate of the statute, that court
set aside Rehman's deportation order. Rehnman v. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976).
Section 1251(a)(11), with its provision for mandatory deportation for a
conviction relating to any drug offense, has been considered to be a very
harsh law.' The courts have uniformly held, however, that it is not within
their province to ameliorate the harshness of this statute. 6
Apparently seeking to circumvent the rigidity of section 1251(a)(11), the
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 220.03 (McKinney Supp. 1976). This is criminal possession in the
seventh degree, the lowest grade drug offense in New York, and a misdemeanor.
2. N.Y. Penal Law § 65.05 (McKinney 1975). This sentence may be imposed if the court "is
of the opinion that neither the public interest nor the ends of justice would be served by a
sentence of imprisonment and that probation supervision is not appropriate." Id. § 65.05(I){a).
3. This certificate was issued pursuant to N.Y. Correction Law § 701 (McKinney Supp.
1976), which states in pertinent part:
"I. A certificate of relief from disabilities may be granted as provided in this article to relieve
an eligible offender of any forfeiture or disability ... automatically imposed by law by reason of
his conviction of the crime or of the offense specified therein." Id. § 701(1).
4. This statute states in pertinent part:
"(a) Any alien in the United States . .. shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be
deported who... (11) is, or ... has been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate,
any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana,
or who has been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation
governing or controlling the. . . sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away [of) marihuana .. .8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970).
5. E.g., Guan Chow Tok v. INS, 538 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Kolios v. INS,
532 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 234 (1976).
6. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32
(1954); Kolios v. INS, 532 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 234 (1976); Bronsztejn
v. INS, 526 F.2d 1290, 1291 (2d Cir. 1975); Oliver v. United States Dep't of Justice, 517 F.2d
426, 427 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976).
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Second Circuit held that for purposes of federal law the certificate rendered
the conviction void and thus deportation could not follow. Other circuits have
held that such certificates have no effect upon deportation. 7 The Rehman
court, however, utilized it as an escape hatch from section 1251(a)(11).
The Ninth Circuit has often had the opportunity to rule on this issue with re-
gard to a California statute8 which provided for the expungement of a criminal
record. Typical of its approach is Cruz-Martinez v. INS, 9 which dealt with a
petitioner who had requested review of a deportation order. At the age of
nineteen, he had been convicted of unlawful possession of heroin and
marijuana and placed in the custody of the state's Youth Authority. Follow-
ing his discharge, an order was entered "which released petitioner from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction, set aside the verdict of
guilty and dismissed the information against him."'10
Despite this expungement, the petitioner's order of deportation was af-
firmed. 1 The court noted that "[d]eportation is a function of federal and not
of state law."'1 2 Commenting upon the effect of the California statute the
Ninth Circuit stated:
(I]t would be anomalous for a federal action based on a state conviction to be
controlled by how the state chooses to subsequently treat the event. It is the fact of
state conviction, not the manner of state punishment for that conviction, that Is
crucial. '
3
The Court then summed up the Ninth Circuit's well established position by
saying:
It would defeat the purpose ... (of federal law) if provisions of local law, dealing with
7. Kolios v. INS, 532 F.2d 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 234 (1976); Gonzalez de Lara
v. United States, 439 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1971); Cruz-Martinez v. INS, 404 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 955 (1969). See also Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 570
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir.
1971).
8. Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns. Code § 1772 (West 1972). The statute in pertinent part states:
"[E]very person discharged may petition the court which committed him, and the court may
upon such petitions set aside the verdict of guilty and dismiss the accusation or information
against the petitioner who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting
from the offense or crime for which he was committed." Id.
9. 404 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 955 (1969). Accord, Chabolla-
Delgado v. INS, 384 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 865 (1968);
Brownrigg v. INS, 356 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1966); Kelly v. INS, 349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 932 (1965); Ramirez-Villa v. INS, 347 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 908 (1965); Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840
(1965).
The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that a Nevada statute expunging a conviction will not
prevent mandatory deportation under § 1251(a)(11). Tsimbidy-Rochu v. INS, 414 F.2d 797 (9th
Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
10. 404 F.2d at 1199.
11. Id. at 1200.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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rehabilitation of convicted persons, could remove them from the ambit of (federal
penal enactments). . . . We do not think Congress intended such a result. 4
The inequity of such decisions had been noted in Kelly v. INS Is where the
dissent termed the Ninth Circuit cases "harsh" and stated that such decisions
"work[ed] cruel consequences . . . to [those) who may become involved in a
single violation of the law .... ',16 Despite these protestations, the Fifth
Circuit in Gonzalez de Lara v. United States 17 adopted the Ninth Circuit's
approach by holding that a Texas statute' s which set aside the petitioner's
conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana, did not prevent his manda-
tory deportation. In language very similar to that used in C-twz-Martinez the
court stated:
[W]e believe that the sanctions of 8 U.S.C. § 125 l(a)(11) are triggered by the fact of the
state conviction. The manner in which Texas chooses to deal with a party subsequent
to his conviction is simply not of controlling importance insofar as a deportation
proceeding-a function of federal, not state, law-is concerned.' 9
The First Circuit, in Kolios v. INS, 2° recently reviewed this issue, and
although sympathetic to the petitioner's position, 2' concluded that a Texas
statute22 expunging his conviction could not prevent his deportation. Earlier,
in Mestre Morera v. INS,23 the First Circuit had carved out a minor
exception to the sanctions of section 125 1(a)(l1). While noting that there was a
strong national policy regarding deportation of aliens convicted of drug-
related offenses, 24 the court found an equally strong national policy regarding
14. Id. quoting Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840
(1965).
15. 349 F.2d 473, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 932 (1965).
16. Id. at 474.
17. 439 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1971).
18. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 42.12 § 7 (1966). The statute provides in part:
"In case the defendant has been convicted [the] court may set aside the verdict. . . and shall
dismiss the accusation, complaint, information or indictment against such defendant, who shall
thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of
which he has been convicted . Id.
19. 439 F.2d at 1318.
20. 532 F.2d 786 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. CL 234 (1976).
21. The court noted: "We add our own view that some flexibility would appear to be
desirable; automatic deportation of all drug offenders, despite conviction for a minor offense,
satisfactory completion of a probationary term, and erasure of the conviction by the concerned
state, would seem to serve no national interest." Id. at 790.
22. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 42.12 § 7 (1966). See note 18 supra for text of statute.
23. 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972).
24. Id. at 1032. Congress' intent that aliens convicted of drug offenses should be mandatorily
deported was clearly evident when it enacted the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, ch. 629 § 301(c),
70 Stat. 575, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970)).
Originally § 1251(b) prevented an alien who had been convicted of a crime and subsequently
pardoned by the President or a state governor, or whom the Attorney General recommended not
be deported, from being deported. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 241(b), 66
Stat. 208. The Act, however, added that "[t]he provisions of this subsection shall not apply in the
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the rehabilitation of persons treated pursuant to the Federal Youth Cor-
rections Act (FYCA).25 Thus, a person who had a conviction erased pursuant
to the FYCA was not subject to mandatory deportation under section
1251(a)(11). 26 In Kolios, however, the First Circuit refused to extend its
holding in Mestre Morera to encompass expungement of convictions pursuant
to state law:
To go beyond this point and recognize other expungement statutes as barriers to
deportation is, we think, to go beyond the Congressional policy [of requiring the
deportation of drug offenders] ...
... It seems highly unlikely to us that Congress, which has narrowly confined the
scope of expungement of conviction in federal drug cases, would contemplate that state
expungement statutes of general applicability could insulate any narcotics offender
from the sanction of deportation. 27
In Rehman, the Second Circuit adopted a novel approach to the question of
whether the issuance of a New York certificate28 would affect the petitioner's
deportation. Although nominally recognizing that congressional intent is the
determining factor in immigration cases, 29 the court's opinion begins with an
analysis of the intent of the New York State legislature. 30 It found "that the
New York legislature could not have intended that recipients of § 701
certificates would remain subject to mandatory deportation."'3'
Having reached this conclusion, the Second Circuit then adopted what it
termed "a less formalistic approach" 32 in construing section 125 1(a)(11). While
acknowledging that even under New York law Rehman had been convicted,
and that the certificate did not expunge that conviction, 3 3 for purposes of
case of any alien who is charged with being deportable from the United States under subsection
(a)(11) of this section." 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970). The First Circuit noted: "For 17 years this
rationale has been accepted by judicial decision, with no contrary action on the part of Congress."
Kolios v. INS, 532 F.2d 786, 788 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 234 (1976).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq. (1970). The certificate under consideration had been issued
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a), which states: "Upon the unconditional discharge by the division
of a committed youth offender before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed upon him,
the conviction shall be automatically set aside and the division shall issue to the youth offender a
certificate to that effect." The First Circuit reasoned that if Congress had not wanted this
provision of the Youth Act to affect drug offenses they would have said so. Mestre Morera v.
INS, 462 F.2d at 1032 & n.3.
26. 462 F.2d at 1031-32. But see Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir.
1962).
27. 532 F.2d at 789-90. The INS recognizes, however, state expungement statutes that relate
to juveniles. Matter of Andrade, 14 1. & N. Dec. 651 (1974). The First Circuit noted the Andrade
decision, found it consistent with congressional policy, but would not reach a holding beyond
what the Board of Immigration Appeals had stated in Andrade. 532 F.2d at 789.
28. See note 3 supra.
29. 544 F.2d at 72-73.
30. Id. at 73.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 74. This is not the first time the Second Circuit has used a liberal interpretation in
reviewing deportation orders where the petitioner's crime involved possession of marijuana. See
Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975).
33. 544 F.2d at 74 & n.5. Mansfield, J., in a concurring opinion, agreed with the majority's
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federal law, the court found him not to have been convicted. 34
This holding was justified by analogizing Rehman's state conviction to
what could have happened had he been tried on federal charges. Since he had
been convicted of simple possession of drugs, it would have been possible for
a federal court to have placed him on probation, and thus, as a first offender,
he technically would never have been convicted. 35 Moreover, the court noted
that since Rehman was twenty-two years of age at the time of his conviction,
he could have been treated as a "young adult offender" and possibly sentenced
under FYCA.36 It would then have been possible under that act to have his
conviction expunged and thus prevent deportation. 3" Combining this analysis
with a conclusion of the New York legislature's intent, the court held:
Where state judicial relief from disabilities is clearly intended to prevent mandatory
deportation, and full expungement of a federal conviction would have been available
in an analogous case, the offender should be held not to have been "convicted" for
purposes of § 1251(a)(11). 38
This holding is quite significant. If it is followed, any alien who has been
convicted of a narcotics offense prior to his twenty-sixth birthday, 39 and who
has received some type of certificate of relief, 40 will not be subject to
mandatory deportation under section 1251(a)(11). The Second Circuit's deci-
sion thus seems to be based on two factors: first, that the state intended the
alien not to be deported; and second, that Congress intended that young
offenders be given special consideration.
Deportation is almost exclusively a federal issue, and not a state concern.
4 1
decision for another reason. He concluded that because Rebman was issued a certificate at the
same time as sentence was imposed, there was no conviction. Id. at 75-76. The concurrence also
attempted to distinguish Rehman's case from those considered by other circuits (see cases cited in
notes 9, 17 & 20 supra), on the basis that in all the other cases the petitioners had to serve a
period of probation before their convictions were expunged, while Rehman did not. Id. at 76.
This reasoning seems to ignore the fact that Rehman was issued only a temporary certificate
which became permanent only after one year. Id. at 78 n.3. Furthermore, the conclusion that
Rehman had not been convicted because he was issued the certificate is contra to New York law.
"The granting of a certificate of relief from disabilities in no way eradicates or expunges the
underlying conviction." Da Grossa v. Goodman, 72 Misc. 2d 806, 809, 339 N.Y.S.2d 502, 505
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
The concurrence also included a discussion of what the New York legislature could have done
regarding marijuana. 544 F.2d at 75-76. Such conjecture seems inconsistent with the Second
Circuits position that "this Court has no authority to prevent deportation because of changing
social mores regarding marijuana." Bronsztejn v. INS, 526 F.2d 1290, 1291 (2d Cir. 1975).
34. 544 F.2d at 75.
35. Id. at 74.
36. Id. See note 25 supra.
37. Id. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
38. Id. at 75.
39. The benefits of this ruling appear to be available only to those who could qualify for
sentencing under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. 544 F.2d at 75 & n.8.
40. Under this ruling the state statute need not actually expunge the conviction. All that is
required is relief from the full effect normally carried by the conviction. See note 31 supra and
accompanying text.
41. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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As the Rehman court noted, section 125 1(a)(1 1) must be interpreted in light of
congressional intent.42 Thus, analysis of the New York legislature's intent
seems strikingly inappropriate. In any event, the Second Circuit's conclusion
that the certificate was intended to prevent deportation 43 would appear to be
contrary to New York law. The New York Supreme Court, in Da Grossa v.
Goodman,44 stated: "[t]hose disabilities which are relieved upon the granting
of the certificate are disabilities imposed upon New York citizens by the
action of certain specific New York statutes. ' '4" Since no New York statute
deals with deportation, it is unlikely that the legislature intended such a
certificate to prevent deportation. 4 6
The second point of the Rehman opinion also appears open to question.
The court, while recognizing that "Congress has exhibited a strict attitude
regarding deportation of convicted drug criminals, '47 nevertheless carved out
an exception to section 1251(a)(11) that is neither within the statute nor
mandated by Congress. Rehman apparently ignores the Second Circuit's own
ruling, announced only three months earlier in Guan Chow Tok v. INS ,41
wherein the court stated:
Congress' decision to mandate the deportation of narcotics offenders is not without
rational justification; accordingly, while we may be concerned at the hardship it
imposes on the minor offender, we must nevertheless follow its strictures.49
Admittedly, Congress intended leniency toward young offenders, 0 and the
policy implications of the New York statute allowing for issuance of the
certificate were nearly identical to those expressed in FYCA. 5 1 Nevertheless,
it appears that the Second Circuit's decision in Rehman goes beyond the
traditional reach of the judiciary in this area. It is one thing for Congress to
42. 544 F.2d at 72-73.
43. Id. at 73.
44. 72 Misc. 2d 806, 339 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
45. Id. at 808, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
46. While it has traditionally been thought that the power to regulate aliens was exclusively
that of the Congress, Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954), the Supreme Court has recently
held that state laws which deal with aliens will be upheld when it is clear they do not conflict
with an express federal policy. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). Thus, it may have been
possible for the New York legislature to specify that a certificate would relieve youthful offenders
from deportation. If this had been done, the court's conclusion regarding the legislative intent of
the certificate would have been justifiable.
47. 544 F.2d at 74.
48. 538 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
49. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Kolios v. INS, 532 F.2d 786, 789 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 234 (1976).
51. The First Circuit in Mestre Morera v. INS, 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972), noted that the
purpose of "the Youth Correction Act [was] to give [the offender] a second chance free of a record
tainted by such a conviction." Id. at 1032. The court in Da Grossa v. Goodman, 72 Misc. 2d 806,
339 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1972), held that the purpose of the New York Certificate was to
"contribute to the complete rehabilitation of first offenders and their successful return to
responsible lives in the community." Id. at 808, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
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remove a group of persons from the ambit of section 1251(a)(11), 5 2 yet quite
another for a court to do so. As the Second Circuit noted in Oliver v. United
States:s3
Mhe Supreme Court has told us, in a decision where it clearly was under strong
temptation to rule otherwise, that the validity of distinctions drawn by Congress with
respect to deportability is not a proper subject for judicial concern.5s
Thus, it appears that Congress alone must decide whether state leniency
statutes can block the deportation of aliens who, but for a state statute, would
clearly be subject to the mandatory sanction of section 1251(a)(11).
The decision reached by the Second Circuit in Rehrnan can no doubt be
morally justified, but as the dissent points out, the court's approach is
questionable:
In the guise of statutory interpretation ... the majority opinion here has contorted the
plain and unambiguous terms of the congressional enactment to achieve what it deems
a socially desirable result.5s
Despite its flaws, Rehman may have great precedential value. The govern-
ment had decided not to challenge the Second Circuit's determination,5 6
which may reflect a policy change on the part of the INS.
The Second Circuit's position also appears to be in accord with a recent
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. In Matter of Lima,57 the Board
held that a California expungement statute eradicated a drug offender's
conviction and thus prevented his deportation. The Board reasoned that the
California sfatute was designed for rehabilitation of youthful offenders, and
since this coincided with congressional intent regarding youthful offenders,
there was no conviction. 58
Rehman, however, does not completely solve the problem. A person
convicted of possession of a small amount of marijuana is still subject to
mandatory deportation if the state has failed to issue a certificate or if state
law does not provide for one. Thus, the deportation of some aliens will still
rest upon the "fortuitious technicalities in state laws."15 9
Joseph I. Loonan
52. It is arguable that Congress still favors deportation of aliens convicted of even minor drug
offenses involving marijuana, and thus its intent is not to have such persons removed from the
sanctions of § 1251(a)(11). See, e.g., Kolios v. INS, 532 F.2d 786, 790 & n.10 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 234 (1976).
53. 517 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S 1056 (1976).
54. Id. at 428, referring to Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
55. 544 F.2d at 80 (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
56. Rehman v. INS, court docket, No. 76-4022.
57. Interim Dec. 2490 (B.I.A., April 16, 1976). This case was neither briefed for, nor cited
by, the Second Circuit in Rehman.
58. Id.
59. 544 F.2d at 75.
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Labor Law-States Are Pre-empted from Regulating Use of Peaceful
Economic Weapons by Parties During Collective Bargaining.-
Following the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and during
contract renegotiations, a union engaged in a concerted refusal to work
overtime. The employer did not attempt to discipline the participating em-
ployees or otherwise resort to self-help, but rather filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The
NLRB dismissed the charge on the ground that the union's actions were not
illegal under the federal labor laws, and were therefore not cognizable by the
NLRB.1 The employer also filed charges with the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission (WERC), which found a violation of the Wisconsin
Labor Law. 2 A state circuit court enforced an order by the WERC enjoining
the refusal to work overtime, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. 3
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the union's conduct
was of the type of peaceful self-help economic activity which must remain free
from regulation by either the NLRB or the states if the congressional intention
in enacting a comprehensive national labor policy was not to be frustrated. In
so doing, the Court expressly overruled a 1949 decision 4 which permitted
states to regulate partial strike activity. Lodge 76, International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Com-
mission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
Originally, all regulation of labor relations was by the states. 5 When
Congress passed the federal labor laws, 6 it did not make clear what effects the
acts were to have on traditional state regulation. 7 Thus, it was left to the
courts to fashion a pre-emption doctrine.8 In the earliest case decided directly
1. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 135 (1976).
2. Id. at 135-36.
3. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 67 Wis. 2d 13, 226 N.W.2d 203 (1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
4. UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
5. See generally 2 T. Kheel, Labor Law § 9.02, at 9-19 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kheel]; C.
Morris, The Developing Labor Law 784-85 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
6. In 1935, Congress passed the first comprehensive labor act, the National Labor Relations
Act, Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-97 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975)) (Wagner Act). Largely in response to what were
perceived as union abuses, Congress amended this act in the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-87
(1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975)) (Taft-Hartley Act). Further amendments were added In the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, tit. VII, 73 Stat.
519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 153, 158-60, 164, 187 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975))
(Landrum-Griffin Act).
7. See Garner v. Teamsters, Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). The Court observed that the
LMRA "leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much." Id.
at 488.
8. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). The Court stated:
"The statutory implications concerning what has been taken from the States and what has been
left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating
elucidation." Id. at 619.
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on pre-emption grounds, the Court held that the states could not enact
regulations which placed burdens on the exercise of the rights to organize and
to choose freely bargaining representatives guaranteed to workers by the
federal law.9 After the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMVRA) in 1947,10 cases involving potential conflicts between state and
federal law arose more frequently, and the Court began to evolve a com-
prehensive pre-emption doctrine."
During this period a variety of approaches was tried. 12 Many of the cases
concerned the states' power to afford relief, either in the form of injunctions
or damages, to the parties of labor disputes.' 3 As to the injunction issue, the
rule emerged that the states were pre-empted from enjoining labor activities
which were either protected by section 7 of the LMRA 14 or prohibited by
section 8,15 except where the activities were violent.' 6 Regarding damages,
the Court held, in a landmark 1959 decision, San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 17 that the states were likewise pre-empted from awarding
damages based on labor conduct, except where violence or "intimidation and
threats of violence" were involved.' 8 Such violent conduct, the Court said,
"touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" that it
could not infer that Congress had intended to deprive the states of power to
regulate the conduct in the absence of an explicit expression of that intent.' 9
The Court held that the states' power to regulate a particular type of labor
activity did not depend on the type of relief sought. The pre-emption test,
which was to be the same whether injunctive or monetary relief was sought,20
was articulated as follows:
9. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
10. Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 14144, IS1-67,
171-87 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975)).
11. See generally Kheel, supra note 5, § 9.02, at 9-32 to 9-36.
12. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 290-91
(1971).
13. A critical factor in these cases was concern over differences among remedies available
under state and federal law. See generally, Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv. L.
Rev. 1337, 1342-43 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Cox]. The pre-emption principles expressed in the
cases during the decade following the passage of the LMRA were "tentative" and "fragmentary,"
and the opinions tended to focus on the facts of specific situations. See San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959). Thus, at first, there seemed to be two separate
lines of cases, one dealing with injunctions and the other with damages. These two lines were
pulled together in Garmon, where a single pre-emption test was articulated. Id. at 244-47; see
notes 20-21 infra and accompanying text.
14. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 474-75 (1955).
15. Garner v. Teamsters, Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488-89 & n.S (1953). See generally Cox,
supra note 13, at 134142.
16. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (19S6).
17. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
18. Id. at 248, quoting UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 640 (1958); accord, United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
19. 359 U.S. at 244.
20. Id. at 246-47.
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When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports
to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an
unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state
jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within
the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between
power asserted by Congress and rquirements imposed by state law ...
... When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well
as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted. 21
The Garmon Court expressly left open the question of whether the states
were free to regulate conduct which was clearly not covered by the Act. 22
Although it had addressed this issue in an earlier case, UAW, Local 232 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (Briggs-Stratton),23 the Court de-
dared that the approach taken in that case was "no longer of general
application. '24 In Briggs-Stratton, the union had engaged in partial work
stoppages in an effort to pressure the employer during negotiations. This
tactic was neither expressly protected under Section 7 nor prohibited under
21. Id. at 244-45. This rule received widespread acceptance and application. See Cox, supra
note 13, at 1350; Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
Colum. L. Rev. 469, 470 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Lesnick]. For example, in Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street Railway Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 302 (1971), an employee
(Lockridge) sued his union for damages arising out of his alleged wrongful suspension by the
union. The union's conduct was arguably an unfair labor practice under the LMRA, but
Lockridge chose to sue in state court on a theory sounding in contract. He argued that the union's
wrongful suspension was a breach of its constitution, which he claimed was a binding contract
between the union and its members. The reason for this choice was apparently that the NLRB's
regional director had refused to issue a charge on the application of a fellow employee who had
been similarly suspended. Id. at 280 n.3. The state court awarded Lockridge damages for lost
wages, and ordered his reinstatement into the union and the restoration of his seniority. Id. at
282. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that under the Garmon rule the state was pre-empted
from affording Lockridge any relief. Id. at 291-92. The dissenting justices objected strongly to the
application of the Garmon rule in the circumstances of this case. For example, Mr. Justice White
wrote: "There seems little point in a doctrine that, in the name of national policy, encourages the
commission of unfair labor practices ...... Id. at 328 (dissenting opinion). Several commentators
criticized the result reached by the majority as being unjust, since the employee was left without
any remedy for the apparent wrong. See, e.g., Lesnick, supra at 482; cf. Cox, supra note 13, at
1370. Of course, it may be observed that in the practical administration of justice it is not always
possible to follow the legal maxim that" 'every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress.' " Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803),
quoting 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 109; cf. United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan & His Staff, 54
F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (impossibility of maintaining action which alleged that defendant
interfered with plaintiff's constitutional rights by causing his downfall, in view of difficulties In
securing service of process and personal jurisdiction over defendant).
22. 359 U.S. at 245.
23. 336 U.S. 245 (1949), overruled, Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
24. 359 U.S. at 245 n.4.
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section 8.25 Therefore, the Court said, "This conduct is governable by the
State or it is entirely ungoverned. ' 26
In trying to divine the unexpressed congressional intention on this issue, the
Court assumed that when Congress had not explicitly displaced the authority
of a state to regulate a particular kind of conduct, it had intended for that
authority to continue. Therefore, since the state had the power to regulate this
conduct before the passage of the LMARA, and since Congress had not
expressly superseded that power, the Court concluded that the state was not
pre-empted from enjoining the union's activities. 7
The approach taken in Briggs-Stratton was undercut by subsequent deci-
sions,28 and was finally overruled in Lodge 76, Machinists.2 9 Drawing on the
wisdom gained during the intervening twenty-seven years (particularly a line
of cases dealing with various NLRB attempts to regulate the use of peaceful
economic weapons by the parties during collective bargaining") the Court
indicated that it had reached a different understanding of the congressional
intention. Under this view, peaceful economic weapons which were not dealt
with in the LMRA were to be left to "the free play of... economic forces," 3'
unregulated by any governmental authority. To allow states to outlaw what
the federal law did not prohibit would impermissibly deprive a party of a
weapon which Congress had left available to him. 32
This change reflects a fundamental shift in the Court's conception of the
role of federal labor law. In Briggs-Stratton the Court stressed that " 'Con-
gress designedly left open an area for state control,'" and that any ouster of
the states' traditional power would have to be clearly expressed. 33 Thus, the
federal law was implicitly seen as a piecemeal takeover of limited areas of the
states' authority. The remainder of the states' power was left intact, and the
states were free to supplement the federal law as long as there was no actual
conflict. In contrast, in Lodge 76, Machinists, the Court emphasized that it
now recognized that Congress had enacted a comprehensive national labor
policy, not a piecemeal or incomplete one. The crucial determination in
deciding whether the states have power to regulate a particular activity,
therefore, was whether that national policy is being frustrated, 3 4 not whether
the inroads of the federal law have cut into a particular state prerogative.
25. 336 U.S. at 253-54.
26. Id. at 254.
27. Id. at 264-65.
28. See Lodge 76, Intl Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 141 (1976). See also note 24 supra and accompanying text.
29. 427 U.S. at 154.
30. Id. at 145; see notes 43-48 infra and accompanying text.
31. 427 U.S. at 150.
32. Id.
33. UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 253 (1949),
quoting Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 750
(1942).
34. Lodge 76, Intel Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. at 147-48.
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In making this determination, the Court35 first briefly reviewed its pre-
emption cases, reducing them to two categories: (1) cases reflecting a concern
that one forum would ban, as illegal, activities which the other forum would
allow; and (2) cases reflecting a concern that state courts might unduly restrict
the exercise of rights guaranteed by the federal labor acts.3 6 It was important,
the Court indicated, to distinguish between pre-emption based on the primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB (the rationale apparently underlying the cases in
category (1)), and that based on the federal protection of the conduct at issue
(the underlying rationale in category (2)).
The primary jurisdiction analysis, was most fully developed in Garmon,
and later explained and summarized in Amalgamated Association of Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge.37 Central to this approach was the federal
interest in propounding " 'a uniform law of labor relations centrally adminis-
tered by an expert agency,' ",38 and in avoiding the danger of conflict between
state and federal legislation. 39
As to the second line of cases, however, the "crucial inquiry [was] whether
Congress intended that the conduct involved be unregulated because left 'to
be controlled by the free play of economic forces.' "40 This inquiry was not
made in Briggs-Stratton, where it was assumed that the only basis for federal
"protection" was coverage by section 7. However, subsequent cases had
recognized an additional and alternative basis for affording federal
protection-certain activities were intended by Congress to be " 'unrestricted
by any governmental power to regulate' " because such activities were eco-
nomic weapons which were purposely left available to the parties. 4' These
activities, therefore, are federally "protected" in that they are "privileged
against state regulation," even though they are not "protected" by section 7
nor "prohibited" by section 8.42
35. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Brennan, J.; Powell, J., with whom the Chief
Justice joined, concurred. See notes 65-76 infra and accompanying text. Stevens, J., with whom
Stewart and Rehnquist, J.J., joined, dissented. See notes 69-75 infra and accompanying text.
36. 427 U.S. at 138.
37. 403 U.S. 274 (1971); see note 21 supra.
38. 427 U.S. at 139, quoting Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 291.
39. 427 U.S. at 139; see notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
40. 427 U.S. at 140, quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971).
41. 427 U.S. at 141, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488
(1960).
42. The Court took notice of the possibility for confusion inherent in this dual use of the term
"protected" conduct. " 'In the context of labor relations law, this word is fraught with ambiguity.
"Protected conduct" may, for example, refer to employee conduct which the States may not
prohibit,... or to conduct against which the employer may not retaliate.' "427 U.S. at 145 n.6,
quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 382 n.17 (1969). The
Court acknowledged, although it apparently did not embrace, Prof. Cox's suggestion that
"permitted" rather than "protected" would be a better shorthand for the kind of activities with
which the Court was dealing in the instant case, since they were protected against state but not
employer interference. 427 U.S. at 145 n.6, citing Cox, supra note 13, at 1346. See also notes
65-66 infra and accompanying text. Perhaps another alternative for lessening confusion in this
area would be for the courts and the labor bar to follow the Court's lead in the instant case and
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In the line of cases developing this analysis, many did not deal directly with
state regulation of labor activities; rather, they involved unsuccessful attempts
by the NLRB to control the use of particular economic weapons by the parties
through the application of per se rules.43 Thus, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents
International Union,44 a case relied on as precedent in the instant case and
discussed at some length therein, the Court emphasized that the Government
must not be allowed to intrude too directly in the collective bargaining
process.4 s The Government has no authority to dictate to the parties what the
substantive results of bargaining should be; nor may it attempt to equalize
any disparities in bargaining power between the parties." Moreover, since
the use of peaceful economic weapons is part and parcel of the overall labor
relations scheme envisioned by the LMRA,'4 the Government may not
regulate such use except where Congress has expressly authorized it to do so.
Since the activities at issue were never expressly outlawed by Congress, and
since it was the congressional practice to be "rather specific when it has come
to outlaw particular economic weapons,"' 48 the Court concluded that these
activities were beyond the control of the NLRB, and must be left available to
the union.
The analysis developed in the NLRB cases "came full bloom" 4 9 in Local 20,
Teamsters v. Morton,50 a case dealing with state regulation of peaceful
economic pressure. In Morton, the union, which was engaged in a primary
refer to such activities as" 'privileged against state regulation.' "427 U.S. at 141, quoting Hanna
Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers, 382 U.S. 181, 187 (1965).
43. 427 U.S. at 145. Generally, under these rules the NLRB would find that a showing that a
party had employed a particular tactic established, without more, that the party had violated its
duty to bargain in good faith. The Court cited as examples of such cases the following American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (employer lockout for purposes of bringing
economic pressure on union); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) (lockout by nonstruck
members of multiemployer bargaining group in response to whipsaw strike against another
member); NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960) (NLRB's interpretation of its
authority to regulate peaceful recognition picketing held too broad); NLRB v. Insurance Agents
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (union's use of economically harassing techniques during contract
negotiations; see notes 44-48 infra and accompanying text); NLRB v. American Natfl Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 395 (1952) (employer conduct in bargaining for a management rights clause); cf. Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Electric Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 805 & n.16 (1974) (union discipline of
supervisor-members for crossing picket line and performing rank-and-file work was not protected
nor prohibited by LMRA so that NLRB could not regulate it); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397
U.S. 99 (1970) (NLRB had power to require parties to negotiate but not to compel employer to
accept checkoff proposal); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (19S7) (lockout held
not per se violation although balancing of union and employer interests was primarily function of
NLRB subject to judical review).
44. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
45. Id. at 490.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 495.
48. Id. at 498.
49. 427 U.S. at 145.
50. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
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strike against Morton, persuaded the management of one of Morton's custom-
ers to cease doing business with him. s1 However, the union did not induce or
encourage the customer's employees to pressure their employer s 2 The union's
activity was therefore neither protected by section 7 nor prohibited by section
8.53 Nevertheless, the Court held that the state was pre-empted from regulat-
ing it. 54 The Court in Lodge 76, Machinists emphasized that a central factor
in the Morton analysis was the understanding that Congress had struck a
balance of power between labor and management when it decided which
forms of economic pressure should be prohibited.55 Allowing a state to outlaw
a particular weapon which Congress had "focused upon"5 6 but had decided to
leave available to the unions would impermissibly upset that balance of
power.
The Court in Lodge 76, Machinists pointed out that this balance-of-power
analysis, although developed primarily in cases dealing with union activities,
is equally applicable to the regulation of economic self-help activities by
employers.5s The Court expressed the central concern in all such cases to be
as follows:
Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the
crucial inquiry regarding pre-emption is the same: whether "the exercise of plenary
51. Id. at 253.
52. Id. at 255.
53. Id. at 258.
54. Id. at 259-60. The Court stated: "This weapon of self-help, permitted by federal law,
formed an integral part of the petitioner's effort to achieve its bargaining goals during negotia-
tions with the respondent. Allowing its use is a part of the balance struck by Congress between
the conflicting interests of the union, the employees, the employer and the community. If the Ohio
law of secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe the same type of conduct which Congress
focused upon but did not proscribe when it enacted § 303, the inevitable result would be to
frustrate the congressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help available, and to upset
the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our national labor policy." Id.
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
55. 427 U.S. at 146.
56. The Court in Morton relied on a legislative history which clearly established that
Congress had "focused upon" the disputed activities during its debates and had deliberately left It
unregulated. 377 U.S. at 259-60. Several commentators had argued that the Morton rationale
should be expanded. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 13, at 1359-68; Lesnick, supra note 21, at 474-75.
The general tendency, however, was to treat Morton as a rather narrow exception to the overall
pre-emption test set forth in Garmon, applicable only when the conduct at issue likewise had
been expressly focused upon by Congress. See, e.g., 427 U.S. at 157 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
Kheel, supra note 5, § 9.08, at 9-195 to 9-200, Morris, supra note 5, at 804-05. This was the
approach of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the instant case. 67 Wis. 2d 13, 26, 226 N.W.2d
203, 209 (1975). However, the Supreme Court's decision in Lodge 76, Machinists indicates
that the Morton analysis must now be given an expansive rather than a narrow application. See
427 U.S. at 154-55, where the Court rejected the Wisconsin court's narrow interpretation of
Morton. See also notes 88-92 infra and accompanying text. This analysis will stand as a full-scale
alternative, complementing, and in some cases, possibly superseding Garmon. See notes 79-82
infra and accompanying text.
57. 427 U.S. at 147.
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state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective im-
plementation of the Act's processes."5 8
Applying this analysis to the instant case, the Court held that the ruling by
the state court could not be permitted to stand. The employer apparently did
have the economic strength to gain acceptance of its negotiating position
solely through use of the weapons available to it under the congressionally
sanctioned balance of power. Nevertheless, "the economic weakness of the
affected party cannot justify state aid contrary to federal law. ' 9 Although the
states can fill a gap in the regulatory scheme which Congress had plainly
intended not to exist, here the Wisconsin law was doing more. As the Court
stated, "Wisconsin '[entered] into the substantive aspects of the bargaining
process to an extent Congress has not countenanced.' "60 The activities in
question were intended by Congress "not to be regulable by States any more
than by the NLRB, for neither States nor the Board is 'afforded flexibility in
picking and choosing which economic devices of labor and management
shall be branded as unlawful.' "61 The Court made clear that both the states
and the NLRB are barred from attempting to enforce their own standards as
to what constitutes an ideal or proper balance in collective bargaining. 62
The Court implicitly recognized that its decision would have a considerable
impact on the economic battleground, and it undertook to clarify just what
weapons were available to the parties. Briggs-Stratton had assumed that an
employer faced with partial strike activities could not counter them by
economic self-help weapons without running afoul of section 8 of the
LMRA. 63 This assumption, however, was no longer warranted. Since these
activities are now understood to be "protected" (in the sense of being
"privileged from state regulation' 64 not because they fall within section 7,
but only because they were meant by Congress to be left unregulated, the
employer here would not have violated section 8 if it had resorted to self-help
weapons. Thus, the Court observed, the employer could have discharged the
participating employees or taken any other appropriate disciplinary mea-
sures. 65 Furthermore, the Court indicated, even as to activities which are
within the coverage of section 7, employers are not left totally defenseless;
they can lawfully impose a lockout, or hire permanent replacements to bring
counterpressure on the union. 66
Mr. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger
joined, agreed that the Wisconsin law upset the "balance of free economic
58. Id. at 147-48, quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
380 (1969).
59. 427 U.S. at 149.
60. Id., quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents Intel Union, 361 U.S. 477, 498 (1960).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 149-50.
63. Id. at 152.
64. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
65. 427 U.S. at 152.
66. Id. at 152-53.
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bargaining power struck by Congress." 67 This did not mean, however, that
the states were precluded from enforcing "neutral" state laws or rules of
decisions, such as their law of torts or contracts, in the context of a labor
dispute. These "neutral" laws were characterized as those "not directed
toward altering the bargaining positions of employers or unions but which
may have an incidental effect on relative bargaining strength. ' '68
Mr. Justice Stevens, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice
Rehnquist joined, dissented.69 He articulated four grounds on which the
majority's finding of pre-emption might have been justified and rejected each
of them as inapplicable to the circumstances of the instant case. First, the
instant case did not fall within the Garmon rule since the disputed activity
was clearly not covered by the Act. 70 Second, the case did not fall within the
Morton rule because Congress had not "focused on" this particular kind of
activity and left it unregulated. 7 1 Third, there was no previous case holding
that conduct not covered by the LMRA was "nevertheless pre-empted by an
unexpressed legislative intent. '72 Finally, the dissent stated, "[ilf adherence to
the rule of Briggs-Stratton would permit the States substantially to disrupt the
balance Congress has struck between union and employer, I would readily
join in overruling it."'7 3 He was not convinced, however, that the partial
strike was so essential to the collective bargaining process that this drastic
step was justified. Therefore, in the interests of stare decisis, Briggs-Stratton
should have been followed. 74
The dissent's last point seems especially significant. It indicates that the
three dissenting justices accepted the validity of the pre-emption test articu-
lated by the majority, i.e., whether state regulation of a particular activity
will disrupt the balance of power struck by Congress, regardless of whether
that activity is arguably protected or prohibited by the LMRA. The dissent
apparently disagreed merely with the majority's conclusion as to the results of
the application of that test in the instant case. Although the dissent expressed
some doubt that the majority's decision would "clarify or harmonize" the
pre-emption law, its language indicates that in a case where the activity in
question is "essential to the bargaining process,"' 7 5 it would join with'the
majority. Thus, it appears that this test itself will not be seriously challenged
in the near future.
Several general observations may be made regarding the Court's opinion.
67. Id. at 156 (concurring opinion).
68. Id. (concurring opinion).
69. Id. (dissenting opinion).
70. Id. at 156-57 (dissenting opinion).
71. Id. at 157 (dissenting opinion).
72. Id. at 158 (dissenting opinion). He distinguished Insurance Agents on the ground that
there the Court held merely that the NLRB was not given authority by Congress to regulate the
disputed conduct. "Congress' failure to grant power over such activity to the NLRB hardly
amounts to withdrawal of the same power from the States." Id. at 158 n.3 (dissenting opinion).
73. Id. at 158-59 (dissenting opinion).
74. Id. at 159 (dissenting opinion).
75. Id. (dissenting opinion).
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First, the question left open in Garnwn-whether states were pre-empted
from regulating conduct which is neither arguably protected nor arguably
prohibited by sections 7 or 8 of the LMRA-has now been answered in the
affirmative, at least regarding peaceful economic pressure exerted by the
parties during collective bargaining. This type of activity is "protected" (in the
sense of "privileged") against interference by both the states and the NLRB.
On the other hand, since this type of activity was left by Congress to the "free
play of economic forces," by definition such activity by one party is not
"protected" from counter-pressure by the other party. Thus, in the instant
case, the Court noted that the employer could have responded to the union's
partial strike by employing weapons such as the lockout, the hiring of
permanent replacements, or the discharge or discipline of the participating
employees. 76
Of course, this counter-pressure must also be of the kind that is not
arguably prohibited by the Act. For example, the employer here apparently
would not have been free to retaliate by discharging participating employees
in a discriminatory manner, i.e., by firing only union activists. Such conduct
is banned by sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act,7 7 and the NLRB would have
jurisdiction to find a violation. Similarly, under this formulation, a union
would not be free to respond to an employer lockout by, for example, coercing
his customers into ceasing to do business with him in violation of section
8(b)(4)(B).78
This leads to a second observation. The Court identified two categories of
pre-emption cases, the first based on the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB
(the Garmon approach), and the second based on the federal protection of the
nduct in question (the Morton approach). 79 Although the Court followed
e second approach in the instant case, and found the first to be "inapplica-
ble,"80 it did not repudiate the primary jurisdiction rationale for pre-emption.
The Garmon rule therefore remains viable and available for application where
appropriate.8 1 The two approaches apparently will coexist and together will
broaden the reach of the pre-emption doctrine. Thus, the instant case expands
the Garmon rule in that peaceful self-help economic activities by the parties
are closed to state regulation whether or not they are arguably within the
protection or prohibition of sections 7 or 8 of the Act. On the other hand, in
cases where the analysis put forth in the instant case would not apply, i.e.,
where the Court can determine that state regulation of a particular activity or
dispute would not upset the balance of power between labor and management
76. Id. at 152-53. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1S8(a)(1), (3) (1970).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970).
79. 427 U.S. 138-40.
80. Id. at 155.
81. Prof. Cox, in his seminal article, stated that the Court "must choose between the retention
of the Garmon rule and exclusive reliance upon the Morton approach . . . ." Cox, supra note 13,
at 1359. The Court did not make such a clear-cut choice in the instant case, since it neither
abandoned the Garmon rule nor indicated that the Morton approach was to be the exclusive
pre-emption formulation.
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struck by Congress,82 the Garmon rule will still pre-empt state jurisdiction if
the activity is arguably within the Act.
Thirdly, the Court expressly reaffirmed certain long-standing exceptions to
the pre-emption doctrine. Thus, the Court noted that the states may clearly
continue to act in matters that are of deeply-rooted local concern, particularly
the policing of violence and destruction of property.83 In addition, the states
may regulate activity which is merely of "peripheral concern" to the LMRA,
such as certain kinds of internal union disputes8 4 and defamation occurring
during an organizing campaign. 85 In the future, parties seeking to invoke
state remedies will probably concentrate on finding ways to include their
dispute within one of the pre-emption exceptions. 86 Even now, the law in this
area is not completely settled.8 7
82. The situation in Lockridge, note 21 supra, would probably be an example of such a case
since the dispute there was between an employee and his union rather than between an employer
and a union. Prof. Cox argues that several important benefits will inure if the Garmon rule Is
scrapped entirely in favor of the Morton approach, notably, that a more just result might be
reached in a situation such as that in Lockridge. See Cox, supra note 13, at 1359-72.
83. 427 U.S. at 136 & n.2. See also notes 16, 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
84. Id. at 137 & n.3, citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617
(1958).
85. Id. at 137-38 & n.3, citing Lin v. Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
See generally Kheel, note 5 supra, § 9.05; Morris, note 5 supra, at 797-800. See also Farmer v.
Carpenters, Local 25, 45 U.S.L.W. 4263 (U.S. March 7, 1977), where the Court heldt that the
LMRA did not pre-empt a tort action seeking to recover damages for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress brought in a state court by a union member against his union and its officials.
Plaintiff alleged that as a result of his complaints to the union regarding discriminatory operation
of the hiring hall, defendants intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct, threats and Intimida-
tion which caused him grievous emotional distress. The Court noted that "[tjhe branch of the
pre-emption doctrine most applicable to the instant case concerns the primary jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board." Id. at 4265 n.5. This case fell within the peripheral concerns
exception to the Garmon rule as developed in Linn. Id. at 4265-66. Although a rigid application
of the Garmon rule might support a finding of pre-emption, the Court stated "that inflexible
application of the doctrine is to be avoided, especially where the state has a substantial interest In
regulation of the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not threaten undue
interference with the federal regulatory scheme." Id. at 4266. However, the Court was careful to
set forth certain limitations on such tort actions arising in the context of employment discrimina-
tion. First, the Court said, "it is essential that the state tort be either unrelated to employment
discrimination or a function of the particularly abusive manner in which the discrimination Is
accomplished or threatened rather than a function of the actual or threatened discrimination
itself." Id. at 2765. Second, recovery must be based on "outrageous" conduct, not "on the type of
robust language and clash of strong personalities that may be commonplace in various labor
contexts." Id. Last, damage awards must not be excessive. Id.
86. See, e.g., Barclay's Ice Cream Co. v. Local 757, Ice Cream Drivers Union, 94 L.R.R.M.
2647 (N.Y. 1977), where the New York Court of Appeals held that the state was not pre-empted
from enjoining picketing aimed at persuading customers not to buy ice cream manufactured
outside, but sold inside, New York State by the employer. The court, citing Linn, found that the
union's activity was merely of peripheral concern to the LMRA, since "[n]o legitimate objective of
labor union activity is here involved." 94 L.R.R.M. at 2648. Therefore, the court concluded, such
a consumer boycott as planned by the union fell beyond the scope of the NLRB's exclusive
jurisdiction. Id.
87. For example, there is currently a conflict of authority over whether the local concerns
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Finally, it may be observed that the Court's holding in the instant case is
capable of being given an expansive reading, and it is possible that in the
future courts may extend its reasoning to areas other than self-help economic
activities. For example, in White Motor Corp. v. Malone,88 one of the first
important cases to interpret and rely on Lodge 76, Machinists, the Eighth
Circuit held that Minnesota was pre-empted from applying its state pension
act to impose upon an employer the obligation to fully fund its employee
pension plan upon closing its factory. The collective bargaining agreement
between the employer and the unions had provided that no such obligation
should exist. The Eighth Circuit, citing the principal case, reasoned that since
"states cannot control the economic weapons of the parties at the bargaining
table, a fortiori, they may not directly contol the substantive terms of the
contract which results from that bargaining." 89 A similar result might have
been reached by applying the traditional pre-emption test of whether Con-
gress had meant to close the field to state regulation when it enacted federal
legislation dealing with pension plans.90 The "primary jurisdiction" rationale
of the Garmon rule, however, would apparently not have been applicable
since the dispute was not arguably within section 7 or 8 or the LMRA. Thus,
since the Supreme Court's ruling in the principal case seems to be of an
expansive character, 91 the Court may in the future need to address itself to
exception permits a state to apply its trespass laws to enjoin picketing on the private property of
an employer. The California Supreme Court held that under the Garmon rule the state was
pre-empted. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1977) (No. 76-750). On the other
hand, the Illinois Supreme Court held contrarily that in view of the "imminent threat of
violence (which] exists whenever an employer is required to resort to self-help in order to
vindicate his property rights," the state's application of its trespass laws fell within the local
concerns exception to the pre-emption doctrine. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Teamsters, Local 743,
64 Ill. 2d 153, 158, 355 N.E.2d 7, 10 (1976). The Illinois court stated that the pre-emption
principle articulated in Lodge 76, Machinists was "not relevant' to the case before it. 64 III. 2d at
166, 355 N.E.2d at 12. In an earlier case involving this issue, Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397
U.S. 223 (1970) (per curiam), the Court first granted a writ of certiorari, 396 U.S. 813 (1969), and
then dismissed it, 397 U.S. 223 (1970). See generally Cox, supra note 13, at 1360-62. Since the
Court has granted certiroari in the Sears, Roebuck case, it may now choose to resolve this issue.
In so doing it may give some further guidance on the application of the pre-emption analysis of
Lodge 76, Machinists.
88. 545 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1976).
89. Id. at 606. The court further stated. "If the legislative solution (to the problem of the
economic travail of the retired workers of the shutdown plant] presented here can be sustained,
then in another day a differently-minded state legislature could take away from working people
contract benefits obtained through hard, fair bargaining. We construe national labor policy to
mandate 'hands off' by the states in this area of labor relations." Id. at 610.
90. See id. at 608 & n.11.
91. See also NLRB v. Printing Pressmen, Local 252 (Columbus), 543 F.2d 1161 (Sth Cir.
1976), where the court, relying on the rationale of Lodge 76, Machinists, held that the courts were
precluded from enforcing an interest arbitration clause in a section 301 suit brought for the
purpose of perpetuating inclusion of such a clause in a new contract. Id. at 1169. The court noted
that once a party had agreed to such a clause-under which the parties were required to submit
all disputes over new contract terms to binding arbitration-the system might become self-
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what, if any, limitations should be placed on the application of its rea-
soning.92
Zachary B. Kass
perpetuating. Id. This would not accord with the basic premise of the Act that labor peace Is
most likely to result when bargaining advantages reflect economic realities. Id. at 1170. Thus,
based on the rationale of the line of cases culminating in Lodge 76, Machinists, the court held
that "[c]ourts cannot bind the parties in perpetuity to forego the use of economic weapons In
support of bargaining positions." Id.
92. Cf., Cox, supra note 13, at 1355: "[Ilf the underlying rationale for federal preemption Is
the need for preserving the balance which Congress struck, some formula is required to measure
the outer limits of congressional concern." Id.
